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INTRODUCTION 
This appeal marks the secoi : Defendants Uwe and Ullrich Michel 
("Michels") have come to this Court attempting to avoid a post-trial judgment by the 
Fourth Judicial District Court quieting title in TWN, Inc., ("TWN"), in and lo a parcel of 
real property located in Utah (and, it was later learned, partially in Salt Lake) Counties 
("Subject Property"), free and clear of Michels' claims of title. 'I V' N ».w ti, the property 
by reason of a December 8, 1998 Quitclaim Deed from Richard Christenson, who had 
purchased the property at a tax sale from Utah County, taking a Tax Deed dated July 18, 
1984. Michels have continued to assert a competing claim to the property arising out of 
their bid at a trust deed sale conducted by Zions First National Bank on April 14.1993. 
The parties have tried their respective claims to the trial court twice. Both times, after a 
review of the evidence presented, the court has found in favor of TWN. 
The first time, the trial court found for TWN on motion for summary judgment with 
the exception of Michels' claim under the doctrine of adverse possession. Michels' 
adverse possession claim was tried to the Court on March 27, 2001; at the conclusion 
thereof, the Court held that, based on the evidence, Michels had failed to make out a 
claim against the property under the doctrine of adverse possession, and quieted title in 
TWN. Michels appealed on December 5, 2001. 
On Michels' first appeal this Court considered claims and arguments on all issues 
properly preserved and presented by Michels; however, it remanded on one issue and one 
issue only: a factual determination of whether, in executing the 1985 Quitclaim Deed at 
issue in this matter, Richard A. Christenson intended to sign the docuincin on behalf of a 
trust, or whether the word "Trustee" after his name was simply added as descriptio 
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personae. 
Pursuant to this mandate, the lower court re-tried the case on August 3 and 31, 
2004. Based on the evidence therein, the trial court concluded that Mr. Christenson had 
not used the word "Trustee" in the 1984 Zion's Bank conveyance solely as "descriptio 
personae", but had intended the document to convey the interest (if any) held by Cape 
Trust to the property described therein (which included the Subject Property in this case, 
among others). Accordingly, the trial court ruled that Mr. Christenson retained title to the 
Subject Property (which had never belonged to Cape Trust), and conveyed good title to 
TWNinl998. 
For the reasons set out below, it is submitted that the trial court fully and properly 
carried out its mandate pursuant to remand of this matter, and that Michels' assignments 
of error to the second trial are groundless. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellee agrees with appellants' statement of jurisdiction. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in permitting Richard A. Christenson to read 
into the record the content of his sworn affidavit when his present recollection could not 
be refreshed thereby, under Utah R. Evid. 803(5); if so, whether Michels waived or 
otherwise failed to preserve their objection thereto. 
2. Whether the lower court's ruling concerning the sole issue on remand (the 
capacity in which Richard A. Christenson executed the 1985 quitclaim deed to Zions 
Bank) was clearly erroneous, in that the properly-marshalled evidence supporting the 
ruling is legally insufficient (Preserved at R. 1379-1380). 
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3. Whether TWN's title to the Subject Property is defeated by operation of the 
doctrine of claim preclusion/issue preclusion; if so, whether Michels properly preserved 
that issue on appeal. 
4. Whethn the )(iX4 I ax I )ml conveyed valid lej'ul tiilc lo the Subject Property 
to Richard A. Christenson (preserved at R. 725-752; 753-755; 768-778); if not, whether 
(1) Michels waived, or otherwise failed to preserve properly, the vn 11 d 11 y 111,. m d n i 
defects in, the 1984 tax sale of the Subject Property as an issue before the trial court. 
(Preserved at R.725-752; 753-755; 768-778.) And (2) any defect in the title coin c> cti by 
the 1984 Tax Deed to Richar1 A. Christenson is now cured by operation of Utah Code 
Ann. §§78-12-5.1-78-12-5.3. (Preserved at R.725-752; 753-755; 768-778.) 
Issue 1 is an evidentiary question; this Court affords the trial cotirt broad discretion, 
and reverses only if that discretion was abused in derogation of Michels' substantive 
rights. Goroschieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, 17 P. 3d 1110; Eggett v. Wasatch Energy 
Corporation, 2001 UT 226, 29 P. 3d 668; Barton v. Barton, 2001 UT App 199, 29 P. 3d 
13. 
Issue 2 is purely a factual question which this Court may not disturb lightly. The 
trial court's findings are reversible only if, having presented every scrap of evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings, the appellants can demonstrate that the sum total of 
that evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain the trial court's findings. 
Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P. 2d 1051 (UT App 
1994); Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, 52 P. 3d 1158; Utah Medical Products, Inc. V. 
Searcy, 958 P. 2d 228 (Utah 1998). 
Issue 3 is a mixed question of fact and law - it was raised before, and determined 
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by, the trial court for the first time only after all issues framed by the pleadings and 
motions had been resolved either by motion for summary judgment or trial (which 
resulted in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R.622-630)). In addition, however, 
the trial court's ruling relied on a set of stipulated facts jointly submitted by the parties 
(R.753-755). Accordingly, to the extent that the trial court's rulings rest either upon facts 
stipulated to or questions of law, they should be reviewed for correctness based on the 
law and facts - Gate City Federal Savings & Loan v. Dalton, 808 P. 2d 1117 (Utah 1991); 
In re Infant Anonymous, 760 P. 2d 916 (Ct. App. Utah 1988); to the extent that they 
derived, or could have derived, from the facts as found by the trial court following trial, 
they should be reviewed on a "clear error" standard (Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure). 
Issues 4 was determined by the trial court upon TWN's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Michels' Motion for Reconsideration, and were not part of this Court's 
mandate on remand. While review pursuant to the first appeal required this Court to 
examine the trial court's determination in light of admissible evidence presented by 
Michels to the trial court (drawing all facts and factual inferences derived from such 
evidence in Michels' favor), and sustain the trial court if, even in light of such evidence, 
Michels demonstrated no genuine issue of triable fact - Rule 56 (c), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; Winegar v. Froerer Corporation, 813 P. 2d 104 (Utah 1991); Gate City 
Federal Savings & Loan v. Dalton, 808 P. 2d 1117 (Utah 1991); Reagan Outdoor 
Advertising v. Lundgren, 692 P. 2d 776 (Utah 1984), review pursuant to this appeal 
requires this Court to determine that the trial court incorrectly applied the law upon 
remand. 
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RULES RELEVANT FOR REVIEW 
Rules 801 and 803, Utah Rules of Evidence, are relevant to the matters before the 
Court incident to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
TWN filed this action to quiet title to a parcel of real property described as follows: 
Commencing 1979 feet West from the Northeast corner of the Northwest quarter of 
Section 15, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and 
running thence South 2630.3 feet; West 1374.6 feet; North 2630.3 feet; and East 
1374.6 feet to the point of beginning ("the Subject Property"). 
TWN claimed title to the property by virtue of a deed from Richard A. Christenson 
individually, dated December 8, 1998; Mr. Christenson, in turn, traced his title to a tax 
deed from Utah County dated June 29, 1984. 
Defendants/Appellants Michel challenged the validity of TWN's title, claiming that 
they had purchased the Subject Property at a trustee sale on April 13, 1993 from Zions 
First National Bank as trustee; in turn, that Zions' title derived from a Quitclaim Deed 
dated March 19, 1985 from "Richard A. Christenson, Trustee." 
The parties submitted all issues to trial court on cross motions for summary 
judgment, TWN's motion dated December 30, 1999 (R.44-46), and Michel's motion 
dated February 25, 2000 (R.60-62). TWN maintained that it held valid title to the 
property by virtue of the 1984 and 1998 deeds. Michels claimed that by the 1985 deed, 
Richard Christenson had conveyed all of his right, title and interest in the Subject 
Property to Zions First National Bank, from whence they derived title by virtue of the 
1993 trustee's deed; also, that Michels had established ownership of the property under 
the doctrine of adverse possession. 
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The trial court's ultimate disposition of the parties' motions denied Michels' motion 
for summary judgment and granted TWN's motion for summary judgment in part; 
reserving for trial, however, Michels' claim of right under doctrine of adverse possession 
(R. 488-490). The parties tried the issue of adverse possession to the bench on March 27, 
2001. On April 3, 2001, the Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
declining Michels' adverse possession claims (R. 622-630). Incident to arguments and 
objections concerning the Court's Findings and Conclusions, Michels, for the first time, 
argued that there was infirmity in the 1984 Tax Deed forming the root of TWN's title, in 
that a corner of the Subject Property had recently been determined to lie in Salt Lake 
County. The Court directed the parties to submit post-trial briefing this issued based upon 
stipulated facts (or, if the parties could not agree upon stipulated facts, upon further 
hearing) (R. 681). The parties stipulated to facts concerning the boundary issue (R.753-
755), briefed the question and submitted it for decision. 
In a memorandum decision dated November 8, 2001 (R.782-785), the Court held as 
follows: (1) that the boundary line issue was (a) not jurisdictional, and (b) not raised in a 
timely manner, and therefore waived; (2) that any challenge to the validity of the 1984 
deed was untimely; and (3) that the Court would affirm the Findings and Conclusions 
dated April 3, 2001 (R.630), and certified its memorandum decision as final. 
Michels appealed the trial court's ruling to the Utah Supreme Court, and filed their 
first Docketing Statement on January 7, 2002 (relevant pages attached as Exhibit 1 
hereto). Therein, Michels listed the following issues as to which they assigned error to 
the lower court's ruling: 
1. Was the trial court in error in refusing to consider parole [sic] evidence to 
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interpret the terms of an ambiguous Quit-Claim Deed? . . . 
2. May a county assess taxes on real property located in an adjacent county and 
hold a tax sale following non-payment of the assessed taxes? . . . 
3. Was the trial court in error in validating (by virtue of a four-year statute of 
limitations) a Tax Deed issued by Utah County relating to real property 
located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah? 
See Exhibit 1 hereto. Nowhere in their first Docketing Statement did Michels preserve on 
appeal the argument made before the lower court, on September 29, 2000, that TWN's 
claim to the Subject Property was barred by virtue of the order entered in the Salt Lake 
County action. Michels filed their brief with this Court (to which this matter had been 
referred in the interim) on July 1, 2002. A copy of relevant pages from Michels' first 
brief is attached hereto as Exhibit 2 - again, no mention is made of the lower court having 
erred in refusing to bar TWN's claim of title under the doctrine of claim preclusion. 
The Court of Appeals issued its decision in this matter on March 13, 2003. Exhibit 
3 hereto. In its Opinion, this Court nowhere found that the lower court should have 
denied TWN's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment under the doctrine of claim 
preclusion - an understandable situation, given that Michels had assigned no error to the 
trial court's ruling in this regard, or otherwise raised the issue on appeal - see Exhibits 1 
and 2 hereto. By contrast, this Court acknowledged, in its statement of facts of the case, 
the factual underpinnings of Michel's "extraterritorial tax sale" argument, yet did not 
reverse the lower court's ruling concerning Michels' claim of infirmity in the 1984 tax 
deed forming the basis of TWN's claim of title by reason of a 1995 relocation of a portion 
of the Subject Property from Utah County to Salt Lake County. The case was remanded, 
instead, only for further proceedings consistent with this Court's holding that, unless 
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countervailing evidence was introduced, the law would presume that Richard A. 
Christenson executed the 1984 QuitClaim Deed to Zions First National Bank with the 
intent to convey his personal interest in the Subject Property, the term "trustee" being 
merely descriptio personae. See Exhibit 3. 
Trial upon remand took place on August 3 and 31, 2004 (R. 1379-1380). At trial 
TWN relied principally on testimony of Richard A. Christenson, grantor under both the 
1984 Quitclaim Deed to Zion's First National Bank (which he signed as "trustee"), and 
the 1998 Quitclaim Deed to TWN (which he signed in his individual capacity). R. 1379 
pp. 18-29. Mr. Christenson had little recollection of the 1985 Quitclaim Deed to Zion's 
First National Bank (it having been part of a great number of transactions occurring 
during that time period, involving numerous parcels of real property on Traverse Ridge, 
and numerous individual and business entities - See R. 1379 p. 36). Rather, 
Mr. Christenson relied upon the content of an affidavit which he had executed January 14, 
1999, which established that "he signed said Quitclaim Deed as trustee for Cape Trust to 
transfer the interest, if any, of Cape Trust in the Subject Property, and not any personal 
interest in the Subject Property". The content of the Affidavit was read into the record as 
Mr. Christenson's recorded recollection, under Rule 803(5), Utah R. Evid. R. 1379 pp. 
26-28. Mr. Christenson further testified in court that he would not have put the word 
"trustee" next to his name on the 1985 Quitclaim Deed if he intended to transfer his 
personal interest in the property. R. 1379 at p. 45. 
Michels' counsel did not cross-examine Mr. Christenson during TWN's case-in-
chief (R. 1379 at pp. 36-37). Michels' own case-in-chief, though, consisted solely of 
cross-examination of Mr. Christenson, which attempted to establish that Mr. Christenson 
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acted inconsistently with continued ownership of the Subject Property following 
execution of the 1984 Quitclaim Deed R. 1380 at pp. 6-101); they offered no direct 
evidence, however, that Mr. Christenson did not intend to convey the interest of the Cape 
Trust to Zion's First National Bank by the 1984 Quitclaim Deed. Id. 
On November 5, 2004, the trial court issued its ruling following the second trial (R. 
1303). A copy of that ruling is attached hereto as Exhibit 4. In its ruling, the trial court 
reiterated the mandate from this Court on remand: 
On remand, the sole factual issue before the Court is whether, in executing the 
1984 Quit-Claim Deed to Zion's Bank as 'Richard A. Christenson, Trustee', 
Mr. Christenson intended to sign as Trustee of the Trust, thereby intending to 
convey the Trust's interests in the Subject Property, or whether he intended to 
convey his own personal interest, adding the term 'trustee' to his signature 
merely as 'descriptio personae'. 
Exhibit 4 (R. 1303) at p.l. The trial court held that TWN had proven, through 
introduction of Mr. Christenson's recorded recollection, as well as his testimony 
concerning his customary use of the word "trustee" in conveyances, that the 1984 
Quitclaim Deed to Zion's Bank had been intended to convey Mr. Christenson's interest as 
Trustee of the Cape Trust, and not his individual interest, in the Subject Property, the 
word "trustee" not having been used as "descriptio personae"', the Court further 
announced itself "unpersuaded by defendants' argument" that Mr. Christenson's post-
conveyance conduct disproved that intent. See Exhibit 4 (R. 1303) at pp. 3-7. 
The trial court entered Findings, Conclusions and Judgment December 2, 2004 
(R.1362). (Exhibit 5.) Michels filed their notice of appeal December 21, 2004 (R.1364). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff TWN, Inc. is a Utah corporation with its principal place of business 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 1-9; R. 14-19; R. 622-630). 
2. Defendants Uwe ("Shaun") Michel and Ullrich ("Ollie") Michel are 
individuals and residents of the State of Utah. (R. 1-9; R. 14-19; R. 622-630). 
3. Shawn Michel is a licensed real estate broker, and is principal broker for Best 
Western Realty. (R. 622-630). 
4. The real property which is the subject of this action is approximately 83 acres 
of land located in the area commonly known as Traverse Ridge, and is more particularly 
described as follows: 
COMMENCING at a point West 1979 feet from the Northeast corner of the 
Northwest quarter of Section 15, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian; and running thence South 2630.3 feet; thence West 1374.6 
feet; thence North 2630.3 feet; thence East 1374.6 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
("Subject Property".) (R. 1-9; R. 14-19; R. 622-630). 
5. Subject Property is located entirely in boundaries of Draper City. (R.622-
630). 
6. The Subject Property consisted of undeveloped property which (unknown to 
Utah County or Salt Lake County) was situated in both Salt Lake County and Utah 
County. Approximately 77 of the 83 acres were located in Utah County, and the balance 
in Salt Lake County. Due to survey errors corrected in or about 1995, Utah County 
believed the Subject Property to be located entirely within Utah County in 1984. (R.753-
755). 
7. Prior to 1984 (and thereafter until 1995), Utah County alone sent out tax 
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billings on the Subject Property. The Subject Property serial number was B-324-A-B (R. 
753-755). 
8. As of June 29, 1984, Zions First National Bank held title to Subject Property 
(R.755). 
9. On or about June 29, 1984, Richard Christenson ("Christenson"), 
individually, purchased the Subject Property at a Tax Sale from Utah County for 
delinquent taxes on the Subject Property. Said tax deed was recorded in Utah County 
Recorder's office on July 18, 1984, as Entry No. 21303, Book 2150, Page 588 of the 
Official Records of Utah County. (R.l-9; R.14-19; R.47-59; R.63-85; R.622-630; R.753-
755). 
10. On September 12, 1985, a March 19, 1985 Quitclaim Deed to the Subject 
Property was recorded from "Richard A. Christenson, Trustee" to Zions First National 
Bank, which had owned the Subject Property prior to the 1984 tax sale. The Quitclaim 
Deed was recorded with the office of the Utah County Recorder as Entry No. 26380 in 
Book 2245 at Page 405. (R.l-9; R.14-19; R.47-59; R.63-85; R.622-630; R.753-755). 
11. Mr, Christenson executed the Quitclaim deed on behalf of Cape Trust, of 
which he was trustee, and not in his individual capacity. (R.1379 at pp. 27-29.) 
12. Mr. Christenson would not have used the word "trustee" after his name if he 
had intended to convey his individual interest in the Subject Property. (R.1379 at p. 45.) 
13. Zions First National Bank thereafter conveyed all its interest in the property 
to Franklin Financial, which returned a deed of trust to Zions First National Bank. (R.91-
128). 
14. Utah County continued to assess entire Subject Property after 1985 (R.753-
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755). 
15. On or about April 13, 1993, Shaun Michel attended a non-judicial foreclosure 
sale being conducted in Utah County by Zions First National Bank as trustee. (R.622-
630). 
16. The April 13, 1993 sale by Zions purported to foreclose a trust deed interest 
in and to two parcels of real property located in Salt Lake County and Utah County, State 
of Utah. (R.622-630). 
17. Parcel 1 of the real property identified for sale by Zions consisted of 
approximately 60 acres located predominantly in Salt Lake County and is not at issue in 
this case; parcel 2 of property offered by Zions consisted of the Subject Property. (R.622-
630). 
18. Shaun Michel was the high bidder at the trustee's sale on April 13, 1994, 
purchasing for $25,000 both the Subject Property and Salt Lake Property on April 14, 
1993. (R.622-630). 
19. On or about April 14, 1993, Michels received a trustee's deed from Zions, 
conveying to them individually all of Zions' right, title and interest in and to the Salt Lake 
Property and the Subject Property. A trustee's deed was recorded with the office of the 
Utah County Recorder the same day. (R.622-630). 
20. Michels have never received any conveyance of any rights, title or interest in 
and to the Subject Property from any third party, other than the April 14, 1993 trustee's 
deed from Zions (R.622-630). 
21. In 1995, pursuant to a survey conducted by the Utah and Salt Lake County 
Surveyors' offices, it was determined that a portion of the Property was actually located 
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in Salt Lake County. Thereafter, and through the current time, Utah County has assessed 
only 77.224 acres of the Property and takes the position that such portion of the Property 
is located in Utah County. (R.753-755). 
22. TWN acquired its interest in the Property pursuant to a Quitclaim Deed from 
Richard A. Christenson, individually, dated December 8, 1998, and recorded in the office 
of the Utah County Recorder on December 17, 1998 as Entry No. 132243 in Book 4904 at 
Page 845. (R.753-755). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Michels' numerous assignments of error to the lower court's ruling boil down to the 
following: 
1. That the trustor/grantee of the 1985 Quitclaim deed, Richard Christenson, 
should not have been permitted to read from his own affidavit as a past recollection 
recorded under Utah P.. Evid. 803(5); 
2. That other evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to overcome the 
presumption of descriptio personae; 
3. That the trial court improperly ignored "the res judicata effect of Judge 
David Young's prior ruling which found that appellant had no interest in the property 
subject to this action"; and 
4. That the trial court should have ruled the 1984 tax sale, which sold the 
Subject Property to Richard A. Christenson individually, violative of Utah Law in that it 
assessed "taxes on real property located in an adjacent county". 
As to the first issue, the trial court properly admitted a direct, sworn statement by 
Richard A. Christenson attesting that his intent in executing the 1984 Quitclaim Deed to 
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Zion's Bank was to convey the interest (if any) held by Cape Trust in the described 
property to Zion's Bank, and that he had no intent to convey his personal interest in any 
property to Zion's thereby. Mr. Christenson (who had no present recollection of the 
capacity in which he executed the Quitclaim Deed) read from a May, 1999 signed and 
sworn Affidavit, conclusively answering this Court's question: that he had signed the 
1985 Quitclaim Deed on behalf of Cape Trust, and not in his individual capacity. He was 
permitted to read the content of his Affidavit into the trial record upon his own testimony 
that the Affidavit was signed when the content thereof was fresh in the his recollection, 
even though, at the time of trial, he had no accurate present recollection of the matters 
contained therein. Before the affidavit was read into the record, Michels' counsel was 
given full opportunity to voir dire the witness - and inquired, not into the foundation for 
its admissibility under Rule 803(5), Utah Rules of Evidence, but on whether the Affidavit 
"refreshed" the witness's present recollection of the events contained therein. When 
Michels' counsel first objected to the affidavit's receipt, the objection was sustained; 
when TWN's counsel laid further foundation and offered the affidavit's content again, 
however, the affidavit was read into the record without further or renewed objection. 
As such (and with respect to the second issue), the lower court's ruling was clearly 
not against the preponderance of the evidence, or clearly erroneous - it was based on 
valid, direct evidence speaking directly to the only issue before the court on remand. Mr. 
Christenson also offered a separate and independent basis for his response to this Court's 
question concerning the capacity in which he intended to execute the Quitclaim Deed: 
that, as an experienced financier and investor in real estate, he did not sign his name as 
"Trustee" to any documents with which he intended to convey his personal interest. 
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Concerning the third issue, Michels' attempt to rely upon the doctrine of claim 
preclusion was not before the trial court at all, not having been raised as part of their prior 
appeal of this matter (even though it was available to them at that time), and therefore not 
part of the remand order. It was, moreover, inapplicable, in that (1) as of the date of the 
order relied on in the Salt Lake County action, Mr. Christenson in fact did not hold any 
interest in and to the Subject Property, having conveyed all interest to TWN in 1998, and 
(2) TWN was not a party, nor in privity with a party, to the Salt Lake County action. 
As to the fourth issue, Michels' arguments concerning assessment of taxes on 
property in an adjacent county, and the preclusive effect of the Utah statute of repose on 
such an argument, were never properly before the trial court; moreover, they had been 
raised, briefed, argued and presented to this Court incident to the prior appeal, yet were 
not addressed in this Court's prior ruling (which, as noted above, reversed on one issue 
only), and formed no part of the mandate on remand. Under the law of the case doctrine, 
Michels should not be afforded the opportunity to re-litigate previously-resolved issues of 
law. Even setting aside this Court's prior consideration and rejection of Michels' 
arguments, moreover, they fail this time for the same reason that they failed last time: 
they were not timely raised to the trial court, they disregard the inclusion of the Subject 
Property on Utah County's tax rolls until the mid-1990s, and they cannot overcome the 
operation of Utah Code Ann. §78-12-5.1 through 5.3, which impose an absolute four-year 
statute of repose upon challenges to the validity of a tax sale in the State of Utah. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ADMITTING THE CONTENT OF MR. CHRISTENSON'S 
AFFIDAVIT. 
Michels focus principally on the trial court's election to permit Mr. Richard A. 
Christenson to read into the record the content of an affidavit which he signed in 1999, 
which directly answered the question put by this Court's prior decision in this case. 
Michels claim, for a number of reasons (addressed below) that receipt of the affidavit's 
content was reversible error. There is considerable irony in this argument. 
The question of Mr. Christenson's intent in executing the 1985 Quitclaim Deed to 
Zions Bank was first resolved below on summary judgment. On appeal, though, this 
Court held that the mere inclusion of the word "trustee" on a conveyance was not 
dispositive of the capacity in which the deed was signed, and that (under Boise Cascade 
Corp. v. StonewoodDevelopment Corp., 655 P. 2d 668 (Utah 1982)) extrinsic 
evidence-including a counter-affidavit-would be needed to establish the representative 
capacity of the signature. Had Mr. Christenson's affidavit simply been submitted to trial 
court in support ofTWN's Motion for Summary Judgment, then, the trial court's initial 
ruling would have been sustained on the first appeal, and there would have been no trial 
on remand. The affidavit was in existence at that time, and clearly qualifies under Rule 
56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure-it speaks to affiant's personal knowledge 
concerning his intent in executing the deed in issue. It would, in other words, have been 
the very counter-affidavit which this Court ruled lacking in support of the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment before the first appeal. Michels would have had no cross-
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examination, no voir dire, no opportunity to object, etc. Yet because Michels were given 
all of these opportunities at trial upon remand, they now appeal again attempting to 
invoke (and, frankly, to invent) a whole new array of procedural trip wires which should 
supposedly have barred the affidavit from coming into evidence. Given the wording of 
its prior decision herein, this Court might well regard the affidavit, on its face, as curing 
the deficiency in the record before it in 2003, and sustaining the trial court's ruling on that 
basis alone - particularly when the affidavit was in existence before this action was 
commenced, and was not created in answer to the prior decision. 
Even setting aside the foregoing, though, Michels' effort to bootstrap the trial 
proceedings into a newly-appealable issue fails on its own merits - the trial court properly 
received the affidavits' content into evidence under Rule 803(5) as a recorded 
recollection. Rule 803(5) of the Federal Rules of Evidence1 has been recognized as a 
broad and flexible vehicle for permitting recorded recollections to come into evidence 
notwithstanding the declarant's lack of memory concerning events or matter recorded, 
and the consequent limitations on cross-examination (since the cross-examiner has 
opportunity to cross-examine on facts as to weight and reliability of the wnting)-United 
States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 558-560 (1988). The rule, moreover, has been interpreted 
to confer broad discretion on a trial court in the admission of recorded recollections: 
*Rule 803(5), Utah Rules of Evidence, is borrowed verbatim from Rule 803(5), Federal 
Rules of Evidence, and had no counterpart in the prior Utah Rules. See Advisory 
Committee Note. Accordingly, interpretations of the corresponding Federal rule are 
instructive. See Winegar v. Slim Olsen, Inc., 122 Utah 487, 252 P. 2d 205 (1953). 
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Broad discretion for the trial judge is clearly intended under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 803(5), as the Advisory Committee Notes indicate: 
'No attempt is made in the exception to spell out the method of establishing 
the initial knowledge or the contemporaneity and accuracy of the record, 
leaving them to be dealt with as the circumstances of the particular case 
might indicate.' 
28 U.S.C. App. p. 581 (1976). United States v. Patterson, 678 F.2d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 
1982); See also United States v. Smith, 197 Fed.3d 225 (6th Cir. 1999). Utah case law 
governing evidentiary rulings generally is in accord - where the trial court must make a 
factual determination as a predicate to ruling on admissibility of offered evidence, an 
appellate court should not second-guess the ruling unless "clearly erroneous" - Spears v. 
Warr, 2002 UT 24, 44 P. 3d 742. 
But Michels seek to impose legalistic foundational restrictions on the lower court's 
discretion in admitting the content of Mr. Christenson's affidavit under the rule. They 
argue that the interval between the signing of the deed and the signing of the affidavit 
should have precluded admission as a matter of law; that more information should have 
been volunteered as to circumstance, authorship, etc.; that the affidavit was suspect as 
"self-serving", etc. The trouble with all of these arguments is that they seek to fabricate 
new legal standards, out of whole cloth and after the fact. Michels offer no legislative or 
decisional support for their proposition that the lower court's discretion should have been 
limited by any mechanical foundational requirements beyond those contained in the rule 
itself. Instead, they simply urge this Court to create, ex nihilo, limitations nowhere 
incumbent upon the trial court at the time the ruling was entered, and to assign error on 
the basis thereof. 
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At trial, TWN's counsel began by asking the following: 
Q. Does the Affidavit bear your signature on page 2? 
A. It does. 
Q. Did you sign it on or about the date that it bears? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When you signed this Affidavit, did you have an understanding that the 
content of the Affidavit was true? 
A. To the best of my recollection at that time. 
Q. As you sit here today, do you have a clear recollection of the statements 
made in that Affidavit? 
A. Well, I signed it, and that was my recollection at that time... 
Q. This however - excuse me - constitutes a correct statement of the events - of 
the matters contained in the affidavit to the best of your recollection? 
A. Yes. 
R. 1379 at p. 17. When TWN's counsel then asked that the Affidavit be read into the 
record by the witness, Michels' counsel objected - not on the basis that TWN had failed 
to establish the witness's knowledge of the matters in the Affidavit at the time it was 
written (although counsel did raise the question briefly - See R. 1379 at p. 18), but on the 
basis that the Affidavit was not being used to refresh the witness's present recollection, 
and that Michels would therefore be deprived effective cross-examination (R. 1379 at 
pp. 18-19). Following colloquy, the Court sustained the objection, and instructed TWN's 
counsel to lay further foundation (R. 1379 at pp. 19-20). The following questioning then 
occurred: 
Q. Mr. Christenson, you have testified that you have signed the document 
that's been marked as Plaintiffs Exhibit 7, and say you test - did you 
sign it on or about the date that it bears? 
A. Yes. 
Q. At the time you signed that, were the contents of the affidavit fresh in 
your recollection? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Excuse me. Did you sign it at the time when you had knowledge to sign 
it correctly - to reflect the information therein correctly? 
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A. At that time. 
(R.1379 at p. 20; emphasis added). At this point, Michels' counsel-without articulating a 
further or renewed objection-sought and obtained permission to voir dire (id). Upon 
having the witness read the content of the Affidavit to himself, Michels' counsel stated 
the following: 
Now I know you think that you made a correct statement when you signed the 
Affidavit. Nobody is questioning that or nobody is questioning your integrity 
on that issue. What I want to ask you is whether in reading that today it 
refreshes your recollection as to why you signed the deed in 1985. 
(R.1379 at p. 21; emphasis added). Upon further voir dire questioning, the witness 
reaffirmed that he had inadequate current recollection of the matters in the affidavit to 
testify thereto from memory, and that the affidavit did not refresh his recollection. 
R.1379 at p. 22. 
When Michels' counsel concluded voir dire, TWN's counsel again asked that the 
witness be permitted to read the content of his Affidavit into the record, to which Michels 
voiced no further objection. (R. 1379 at p. 23). The Court therefore granted leave, and 
the Affidavit was read into the record: 
A. "Affidavit. State of Utah. County of Salt Lake. Richard A. Christensen 
being duly sworn upon his oath deposes and states as follows. 
One, the client is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
Two, the client is currently employed as president of Franklin Financial 
Incorporated. 
Three, the client has been in the business of financing, developing and acquiring 
real estate property for more than 35 years. 
Four, the client has refused — excuse me, has reviewed that certain tax deed dated 
June 29th, 1984 and recorded in Utah County on July 18th, 1984 as entry No. 21303 
in book 2150 at page 588 of the official records of Utah County, a copy of which is 
attached as Exhibit A and declares that he is the Richard Christensen to whom the 
tax deed was granted by Utah County for approximately 83 acres of land in Section 
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15, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, the subject property. 
The client has reviewed that certain quit-claim deed dated March 19th, 1985 and 
recorded in Utah County December 12th, 1985 as entry No. 26380 in book 2245 at 
page 405 of the official records of Utah County, a copy of which is attached as 
Exhibit B and declares that he signed said quit-claim deed as trustee for Cape Trust 
to transfer the interest, if any, of Cape Trust and subject property and not of any 
personal interest in subject property. 
The legal description contained in Exhibit B differs from that of Exhibit A because 
the interest being conveyed in Exhibit B was the interest of Cape Trust and not the 
personal interest of Richard Christensen. 
Six, the client has reviewed that certain quit-claim deed dated December 8th, 1998 
and recorded December 17th, 1998 as entry No. 132243 in book 4904 at page 825 of 
the official records of Utah County, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit C and 
declares that he is the same Richard A. Christensen who executed said deed as 
grantor and intended that his personal interest in subject property be conveyed to 
TWN, Inc. 
Dated this 14th day of January, 1999." My signature and the notary page. 
R.1379 pp. 27-29. 
Given the foregoing, any argument that the trial court abused its discretion in 
permitting the content of Mr. Christenson's Affidavit to be read into the record faces 
three insurmountable obstacles. 
A. TWN laid sufficient foundation for admissibility of the affidavit's content 
that the trial court's ruling cannot be held an abuse of discretion. 
Rule 803(5) permits the content of a recorded recollection to be entered into 
evidence "concerning a matter about which the witness once had knowledge but now has 
insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to 
have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness's 
memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly". Each and every element of the Rule's 
requirements was expressly addressed in the witness's testimony. He stated that the 
Affidavit contained information of which he had knowledge at the time of its creation. 
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He stated that it was created while the matters contained in the Affidavit were fresh in his 
memory. He stated that he did not have sufficient present recollection of the matters in 
the Affidavit to permit him to testify thereof. The Rule requires no more than this. 
Michels acknowledge as much. At p.21 of their brief, Michels articulate a three-
part test for admitting a past recorded recollection into evidence, every element of which 
was included in the foundation laid for Mr. Christenson 's affidavit at trial. They then 
suggest, though, that it was incumbent upon TWN to offer far more as foundation for the 
affidavit. First, they offer (with the single exception of the "freshness" argument 
addressed at subpoint B., below) no concrete foundation which TWN should have laid, 
but did not, to qualify the affidavit under Rule 803(5), nor to they cite statute, case law or 
commentary establishing the necessity of such foundation. Second, Michels were granted 
full opportunity to voir dire the witness before the Affidavit's contents were received. 
The very purpose of voir dire is to permit an opposing party to challenge the sufficiency 
of the foundation laid for the admission of evidence - See United States v. Senak, 527 F. 
2d 129 (7th Cir. 1975). Yet Michels' voir dire questioning of Mr. Christenson touched on 
none of the supposed failings which they attempt to urge to this Court. Rather, Michels' 
counsel attempted to establish that, because the Affidavit did not refresh Mr. 
Christenson's then-present recollection, it was inadmissible {see, in this regard, Point II 
below). Given the foregoing, the trial court had ample basis upon which to exercise its 
discretion in admitting the content of the Affidavit. 
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B. Mr. Christenson's affidavit did not need to refresh present recollection to 
become admissible. 
At p.20 of their brief, Michels apparently contend that since Mr. Christenson's 
affidavit did not refresh his present recollection of the matters set out therein, TWN failed 
in its burden of proof. This argument (if it was what Michels intended) confuses two 
evidentiary principles. 
Present recollection may be refreshed by any documentary evidence. Neither the 
documentation nor its content become evidence, since the witness' memory of the matter 
recorded has been refreshed, and he is able to testify thereto independently. See Rule 
612, Utah R. Evid. Recorded recollection, by contrast, assumes the writing does not 
refresh the witness' recollection, but truly and accurately recorded that recollection at a 
time in the past when recollection was fresh - see discussion above and in TWN's 
opening memorandum. The content of the recording then becomes evidence. Rule 
803(5), Utah R. Evid. 
Mr. Christenson was clear that, by August of 2004, he could not speak accurately to 
this Court's question on remand. He was equally clear, though, that he had signed a 
sworn affidavit at a time when he was able to answer that question. While Michels' 
counsel relied principally on Rule 612 in his questions and argument, the court properly 
received the affidavit's content under Rule 803(5). 
C. TWN offered sufficient foundation to establish that the affidavit's 
content was fresh in the witness's recollection. 
Michels argue that the affidavit was signed too long after the quitclaim deed, and 
that the intent of the signer could not, as a matter of law, have been "fresh" in his 
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recollection under any circumstances. Michels do not suggest how long would not have 
been "too long"; they cite to no rule or case law setting out any standard as to what 
showing should have been made in this regard, beyond the witness's own testimony 
thereof; and they omit to mention that Mr. Christenson himself, under oath, stated that the 
content of his affidavit (also signed under oath) was fresh in his recollection when he 
signed. Michels simply urge this court to find that, by not assuming (on intuition, 
apparently) that Mr. Christenson was lying, twice and under oath, about having a "fresh" 
recollection when he signed the affidavit, the trial court abused its discretion in admitting 
the affidavit's content. 
As Michels themselves admit {see Appellant's Brief at pp. 21-25), there is no set 
temporal requirement beyond which a writing cannot contain information still "fresh in 
the witness's memory". In fact, the common-law rule of "past recollection recorded" 
(which did require at least that the recording be "made at or near the time of the events 
recorded") was deliberately abandoned in the formulation of the current rule, in favor of a 
discretionary "case-by-case analysis" - see United States v. Patterson, cited supra; United 
States v. Smith, cited supra. The foundational question is not the lapse of time between 
the events recorded in the writing and the writing's creation, but whether, at the time the 
writing was created, the substance thereof was clear in the witness's memory. In this 
regard, Mr. Christenson presented clear and direct foundational evidence for the Court -
not only by swearing, on the stand on August 3, 2004, that the matter reported was fresh 
in his recollection, but by swearing to the affidavit itself in January of 1999. Taken 
together, these facts furnish more than adequate foundation to place the affidavit's 
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admissibility within the trial court's discretion. 
D. Michels did not timely object to the court's receipt into evidence of the 
affidavit's content 
In addition to the propriety of admitting the affidavit's content based on the 
foundation laid, Michels made no timely objection to its receipt. TWN's counsel made 
one attempt to have the Affidavit's content received into evidence, which was met with 
an objection - and that objection was sustained. TWN's counsel then backed up and tried 
again. This time, foundational testimony which directly tracked the requirements of Rule 
803(5) was elicited from the witness. When TWN's counsel again offered the contents of 
the Affidavit, Michels' counsel did not object, but only requested permission to voir dire. 
The voir dire centered not on the foundational prerequisites of the Affidavit's content as a 
recorded recollection, but on whether it refreshed the witness's present recollection. The 
colloquy between Michels' counsel and the Court (R.1379, p.23) contains no objection to 
admissibility of the Affidavit's contents as a recorded recollection due to incomplete or 
inadequate foundation. To the extent that Michels' counsel objected at all was strictly on 
the basis that "I don't think (inaudible) document that was created outside of the court 
indicating you remembered something once but he doesn't today and I can't cross-
examine him." (Id.). TWN's counsel again asked that the Affidavit's content be read into 
the record, which the Court assented without further objection from Michels' counsel. 
A trial court's receipt into evidence of the content of a recorded recollection must 
be challenged by a timely and proper objection. Where opposing counsel does not object, 
or objects upon separate and unrelated grounds, receipt of the recorded recollection's 
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contents cannot be reversible error. See United States v. Senak, 527 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 
1975); 5 Weinstein 's Federal Evidence (2d Ed.) at § 803.07[3][c], p. 803-50. 
In summary, then, TWN laid an adequate foundation for the content of Mr. 
Christenson's 1999 Affidavit; Michels may not claim before this Court that the trial court 
erred by not requiring further foundational testimony, particularly when it afforded their 
counsel the opportunity to voir dire (which was used on an unrelated evidentiary 
challenge); and no timely and applicable objection was made to the Affidavit's reading. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING WAS SUPPORTED BY 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, AND WAS NOT CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS. 
With (or indeed, without - see Subpoint C , below) the content of Mr. Christenson's 
affidavit, ample support appears from the record to sustain the trial court's answer to this 
Court's question from the prior appeal: that the 1985 quitclaim deed was executed in a 
trustee, not an individual, capacity. 
Michels, though, fall to harping on what else Mr. Christenson's affidavit might 
have included, what evidence they presented on cross which they urge was dispositive 
(even though the trial court found it "unpersuasive"), and how it was "conclusory" and 
"self-serving". 
A, The content of the affidavit was sufficiently "explicit and forthcoming" 
to sustain the trial court's ruling, and was neither "conclusory" nor 
"self-serving". 
Michels seize upon language at footnote 5 of the Opinion in TWN 1 for the 
proposition that, on the stand, Mr. Christenson was not sufficiently "explicit and 
forthcoming" in his declaration that he executed the 1985 Quitclaim Deed on behalf of 
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Cape Trust. It is difficult to understand how Mr. Christenson's sworn statement could 
have been more explicit in this regard. It expressly establishes Mr. Christenson's own 
intent in executing the Quitclaim Deed - something to which he (and, in fact, only he) can 
speak on firsthand knowledge2. 
Michels next argue that the Affidavit should have been disregarded as "conclusory" 
and "self-serving". They complain that Mr. Christenson had no present recollection on 
the stand to supplement the affidavit (a necessary foundational element for the affidavit's 
admissibility- Appellants' Brief at p. 21), and that other, unspecified details were 
somehow incumbent upon TWN and its counsel to afford the trial court the legal right to 
rely on the affidavit. Neither authority nor particulars are offered to shore up this 
contention. Finally, neither Mr. Christenson nor Cape Trust stood to keep title to the 
property at issue in this case, regardless of the outcome of trial. How his testimony, one 
way or the other, on the remanded issue is "self-serving" is mystifying. 
2In addition, Michels take the "explicit and forthcoming" statement in this Court's 
footnote out of context. The Court was apparently analogizing from Utah Code Ann. §75-
7-409(2) (which section deals with publication of terms of a trust in connection with 
conveyance to a trustee). This Court's main opinion, however, stated that inclusion of 
such language as "in my capacity as trustee for the XYZ trust" would be sufficiently 
"explicit and forthcoming"; by the same token, an affidavit furnishing the same 
information by extrinsic evidence would also suffice-Boise Cascade Corp. v. Stonewood 
Dev. Corp., 655 P.2d 668 (Utah 1982). Mr. Christenson identified the trust for on behalf 
of which he had acted in 1985 by affidavit read from the stand, rather than on the face of 
the conveyance itself. By this Court's express prior ruling, this was sufficient to rebut the 
presumption of descriptio personae. 
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B. Michels may not attach the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining the trial 
court's ruling by urging their own evidence. 
Michels make much of the testimony which they elicited from Mr. Christenson 
concerning his conduct after signing the 1985 deed, arguing that this Court should step in 
and rule that it somehow defeats the evidence upon which the trial court chose to rely. 
When an appellant attacks the trial court's evidentiary basis, this Court must begin with 
the evidence supporting the findings as entered - not with the appellant's view of how the 
trial court should have ruled. Christensen v. Munns, 812 P. 2d 69 (Ct. App. Utah 1991). 
Only if the evidence as a whole "clearly preponderates" against the trial court's ruling 
(Jeppson v. Jeppson, 684 P. 2d 69 (Utah 1984)), and if the decision is against "the great 
weight of evidence" (England v. Horbach, 944 P. 2d 340 (Utah 1997)) should this Court 
override the deference due its factual ruling. This is Michels' second trip to this Court in 
this case; something more than the bare recitation of a legal basis for appeal should be 
required. 
Again, the sole issue remanded to the trial court was the capacity in which Richard 
A. Christenson executed the 1984 Quitclaim Deed to Zion's First National Bank -
whether he was actually conveying on behalf of the Trust, or whether he was transferring 
his personal interest, and using the word "trustee" only as "descriptio personae". At trial 
on remand, TWN presented Mr. Christenson's own written statement, to which he 
attested on the stand, establishing that his intent in executing the 1984 Quitclaim Deed 
was to convey the interest of Cape Trust, of which he was trustee at the time, and not to 
convey his individual interest. As such, he did not intend to use the word "trustee" as 
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"descriptio personae" only. Christenson further testified that this would have been a 
practice which he would not employ. 
When the trial court admitted the affidavit's content over their objection, Michels 
attempted to introduce evidence suggesting that Mr. Christenson's conduct after 
execution of the 1984 Quitclaim Deed was inconsistent with his intent to convey Cape 
Trust's interest, rather than his own, to Zion's Bank. The trial court duly considered all 
of this evidence but found it "unpersuasive" to dislodge Mr. Christenson's recorded 
recollection and evidence of habit and custom, and concluded that the direct evidence 
presented by TWN was sufficient to answer the factual issue posed by this Court on 
remand. 
In sum, the trial court had express, direct evidence from the sole source of 
information responsive to the issue on remand, and ruled accordingly. It is simply 
inconceivable that this Court would step in, substitute its own judgment for Judge 
Howard's, and find his ruling "clearly erroneous" based on nothing but circumstantial 
evidence of Mr. Christenson's post-conveyance conduct, and counsel's attempts to 
characterize that conduct as inconsistent with his affidavit. The trial court's findings are 
based on and supported by the evidence. Michels had their day in court, and failed to 
persuade the trier of fact. 
C. Even without the content of Mr. Christenson's affidavit, the court had an 
evidentiary basis for its finding. 
Even were this Court to conclude that a possibility existed that the trial court 
committed error in admitting the content of Mr. Christenson's 1999 Affidavit, it would 
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constitute no more than harmless error. Having read the content of his Affidavit into the 
record, Mr. Christenson was asked the following: 
Q. Is your habit in your business activities to sign a conveyance as 
trustee when you're not acting on behalf of the trust? 
Mr. Nelson: Objection, Your Honor. That's leading, also. 
Mr. Rampton: It's not leading, Your Honor. He can answer "yes" or "no". 
The Court: Overruled. Why don't you repeat the question? 
Q. (by Mr. Rampton) Is it your habit when signing a document 
that says "Trustee" - well, I'm sorry. Let me rephrase the 
question. 
Do you make it a habit as your business activity to sign a 
document stating that your signature is on behalf of- is as 
trustee if you're not acting on behalf of the trust? 
A. No. We try to be very specific as to what trust I'm conveying 
(inaudible) signing it. 
Q. Would it be unusual for you to try to convey an individual 
interest on a document that says "Trustee" on it? 
A. You wouldn't put "Trustee" in it if you were signing 
(inaudible). 
(R. 1379 at p. 39). The trial court relied expressly on Mr. Christenson's testimony in this 
regard when entering its Memorandum Decision in this matter: 
Moreover, the Court is persuaded by Mr. Christenson's testimony that he 
would not have signed as "Trustee" unless he was acting in behalf of Cape 
Trust. 
(Memorandum Ruling of November 5, 2004, R. 1303, at p. 5). 
Where a separate, independent basis for sustaining a trial court's ruling on factual 
issues exists, the evidence cannot be found to "clearly preponderate" against the decision, 
and the ruling must be affirmed. See Jenson v. Brown, 639 P. 2d 150 (Utah 1981). Mr. 
Christenson's testimony that, as a matter of business practice, he would not have executed 
a Quitclaim Deed with the word "Trustee" after his name, if he intended to convey his 
individual interest was sufficient, standing alone, to render the trial court's ruling not 
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"clearly erroneous", and subject to attack. 
POINT III MICHELS MAY NOT ASSERT "RES JUDICATA" AS 
AN ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Michels claim that the trial court erred in refusing to entertain their argument based 
on the alleged preclusive effect of a judgment entered in a separate Salt Lake County 
action. First, while the claim was argued to the trial court before the first appeal, it was 
not included in the first appeal, and has therefore been waived. Its consequent absence 
from the order on remand, moreover, precludes is assertion at this late date under the 
doctrine of law of the case. Finally, the doctrine cannot sustain Michels' claim. 
A. Michels failed to preserve their claim preclusion argument on the first 
appeal. 
Michels apparently hope to have this Court overlook the fact that their claim 
preclusion argument was addressed to, and rejected by, the trial court prior to their first 
appeal. But Michels failed, in that appeal, to assign any error to the trial court's ruling in 
this regard. Accordingly, it was neither presented to, or ruled upon, by this Court in the 
first appeal. Its exclusion as part of the mandate on remand was not error on the trial 
court's part, but a function of Michels' waiver of the claim in the first appeal. 
Michels' failure to raise their claim preclusion argument on the first appeal creates a 
further procedural barrier. When an appellate court reverses a trial court decision on 
appeal and remands for further proceedings, the case is remanded with a mandate from 
the court of appeals consistent with its opinion, which becomes the "law of the case." 
See, Bailey-Allen Company, Inc. v. Kurzet, 945 P.2d 180 (UT App 1997); Corbett v. 
Fitzgerald, 709 P.2d 384 (Utah 1984). Only if issues are expressly left open by the 
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appellate court decision does the trial court have discretion to take up such issues on 
remand. Slattery v. Covey & Company Inc., 909 P.2d 925 (UT App 1995). Moreover, 
prior decisions of the trial court from which no appeal was taken are preserved and 
remain in full force and effect, unaffected by any portions of the trial court's decision 
reversed or remanded pursuant to appeal. See, Bailey-Allen Company, Inc. v. Kurzet, 945 
P.2d 180 (Utah App. 1997) ("any portion of a judgment not appealed from continues in 
effect, regardless of the reversal of other parts of the judgment"-945 P.2d at 194). 
The trial court in this matter had no mandate to address any issue other than that 
framed by this Court's prior decision. The fact that the prior decision did not address 
their claim preclusion argument is their own doing - they did not appeal it. Michels' 
effort now to assign error to the trial court's refusal to countenance an affirmative defense 
nowhere preserved as an issue during the prior appeal, or authorized by this Court's 
mandate on remand, must be rejected. 
B. The doctrine of claim preclusion is, in any event, inapplicable. 
In the case of Snyder v. Murray City Corporation, 2003 Utah 13, 73 P.3d 325, the 
Utah Supreme Court articulated the elements of "claim preclusion" (formerly res 
judicata) as follows: 
Generally, claim preclusion bars a party from prosecuting in a subsequent 
action a claim that has been fully litigated previously. [Citations omitted] In 
order for a claim to be precluded under this doctrine, the party seeking 
preclusion must establish three elements: 
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the 
claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or 
be one that could and should have been raised in the first action. Third, the 
first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
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2003 Utah at 19 (quoting Miller v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co., 2002 Utah 6, 44 P.3d 
663). Michels invoke claim preclusion by arguing that an order entered by Judge David 
Young in August of 2000 in the Salt Lake County action, to the effect that Richard A. 
Christenson had no right, title or interest in and to the Subject Property, somehow 
precludes TWN from asserting its quiet title claim in this action. The claim fails for the 
following reasons. 
1. Plaintiff was not a party to the Salt Lake County action, nor was it in 
privity with any party thereto at the time of Judge Young's order. 
To be precluded under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a party must have been 
either a party to the prior case where the issue in question was litigated, or in privity with 
such party. Michels acknowledge that TWN was not a party to the Salt Lake County 
action, but claim that, as successor-in-interest in and to the Subject Property, it was 
nonetheless in "privity" for purposes of the claim preclusion doctrine (Appellants' Brief 
at p. 37). 
The Court must note, however, that Judge Young did not enter the order in question 
until August of 2000. By that date, TWN had been the owner of the Subject Property for 
over two years, having received a quitclaim deed from Richard A. Christenson in 1998. 
By law, a successor-in-interest in real property is in "privity" with its transferor, for 
purposes of claim preclusion, only if the transfer happens after the entry of the judgment 
as to which preclusive effect is claimed. If the transfer precedes filing of the action, there 
is no privity. If the transfer occurs while that action [spending, but before judgment is 
entered, it has preclusive effect on the transferee (in other words, the transferee is in 
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"privity" with the transferor) only to the extent that statutes requiring the recording of 
notice of a pending action relating to the property have been complied with. See, 
generally, 18 Moore's Fed, Prac. (3d Ed.) at Section 131.40[3][b][ii], p. 131-139. 
Plaintiff TWN was not joined as a party to the Salt Lake County action either at the outset 
or by way of amendment thereafter; by the same token, no lis pendens was filed in the 
Salt Lake County action pursuant to Utah law (R. 1240 at Exhibit 14 thereto). 
Accordingly, Plaintiff is neither a party to the Salt Lake County action, nor in "privity" 
with such party under governing law, and it not bound by the judgment entered therein. 
2. Plaintiffs claim was not presented, and could not have been presented, 
in the Salt Lake County action. 
The case before Salt Lake County was a foreclosure suit brought by Richard A. 
Christenson (in his individual capacity) against a battery of named defendants, seeking to 
foreclose a contract right, secured by an interest in numerous properties (including, 
apparently, the Subject Property) as security for a $1 million obligation (R 1240 at Exhibit 
15 thereto). In light of the relief being sought, the Court's ruling - regardless of its 
wording - was clearly to declare that Mr. Christenson's claimed contract interest (the only 
claimed interest at issue in the action) was not valid. As Mr. Christenson had asserted no 
other interest in the properties, the Salt Lake County judgment may not be read as 
preclusive of Plaintiff TWN's quiet title claim in this action. 
POINT IV. MICHELS MAY NOT REVISIT THE VALIDITY OF THE 
1984 TAX SALE 
Point IV of Michels' brief asserts that the 1984 tax sale was jurisdictionally invalid, 
in that it included property outside of Utah County; further, that the trial court erred in not 
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taking up the issue on remand. Michels' argument in this regard, however, suffers from 
four failings, two procedural and two substantive. 
A. Michels' claims concerning the 1984 tax sale were not timely raised 
before the trial court, and must be deemed waived. 
Rule 12(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states as follows: 
A party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by motion or 
by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense's failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted, the defense's failure to join an indispensable 
party, and the objection or failure to state a legal defense to a claim may also 
be made by later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on 
the pleadings or at trial on the merits, and except (2) that, whenever it appears 
by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the 
subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. 
Michels' claim that there was an infirmity in the 1984 tax sale, thereby defeating 
TVVN's root of title, did not constitute a Rule 12(b)(6) motion; neither did it challenge the 
trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. It was therefore incumbent upon Michels to raise 
the validity of the 1984 tax sale at some point in their pleadings. This Michels simply 
failed to do. 
At paragraphs 10-11 of its Complaint (R.l-9), TWN alleged that the 1984 tax sale 
to Richard Christenson was valid in all respects; further, that any challenge thereto was 
barred by operation of Utah Code Ann. §78-12-5.2. In their Answer (R.14-19), Michels 
acknowledged that the sale had taken place more than four years before, but generally 
denied that their challenge was time-barred. Michels pled no separate claim that the tax 
sale was invalid due to the location of the Salt Lake/Utah County line. See Answer 
(R.14-19) at paragraphs 10 and 11; Counterclaim (R.323-330). TWN then brought a 
motion for summary judgment on all issues in the action (R.44-46); the general question 
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of the 1984 tax sale's validity was expressly briefed and addressed therein. Again, 
nowhere in their briefing did Michels challenge the validity of the 1984 tax sale by reason 
of the county line location, or claim that the wrong county conveyed to Christenson. In 
its ruling, the trial court granted summary judgment on all issues except one: whether 
Michels could establish a claim to the property by adverse possession. It was on this 
issue alone that the case proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of the evidence3, the trial 
court ruled that the elements of adverse possession had not been met. Only incident to the 
finalization of findings and conclusions following trial did Michels voice the theory that 
the 1984 tax deed was assailable due to a portion of the property falling into Salt Lake 
County. 
Accordingly, in its November 8, 2001 Memorandum Decision (R.782-785), the trial 
court noted: 
The plaintiffs argue, first of all, that the defendants should not be entitled to 
bring this new issue [the validity of the 1984 tax sale] before the Court after 
summary judgment and trial on a narrow and different issue. The Court has 
allowed the question to be heard because of the argument that the question 
was not procedural but jurisdictional. Jurisdiction cannot be waived or 
created by stipulation. Nevertheless, after considering the briefs and 
stipulated facts, the Court is satisfied that this question is not jurisdictional 
and that the Court did have jurisdiction to issue a final judgment as ordered. 
The issue was not raised in a timely manner and should not, therefore, have 
been considered. 
Michels did not properly appeal this ruling of the trial court in their first appeal. 
3The Court should note that during the trial on adverse possession, defendant Uwe Michel 
expressly testified that he believed a portion of the Subject Property to lie in Salt Lake 
County; clearly, defendants were aware of the substance of their claim before that time, 
yet chose not to raise it until after trial. 
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They did not respond before the lower court to the untimeliness of their argument; they 
nowhere preserved their objection to the trial court's ruling; and there was nothing before 
this court on the first appeal assigning as error the lower court's timeliness ruling. This 
Court therefore properly omitted any mention of the tax sale's validity from its prior 
remand of this matter. 
B. Reconsideration of the 1984 tax sale's validity did not form part of the 
trial court's mandate on remand from the first appeal. 
At pp. 38-39 of their brief, Michels argue that the trial court, following remand of 
this matter from the first appeal, committed reversible error in not revisiting their tax sale 
validity argument, even though this Court issued no mandate to do so as part of its order 
of remand. 
Where an appellate court remands a trial court decision for further proceedings, 
determinations of law made at the appellate level become "law of the case" with respect 
to further proceedings. As explained by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Gildea v. 
Guardian Title Company of Utah, 2001 UT 75, 31 P.3d 543: 
Under the law of the case doctrine, issues resolved by this Court on appeal 
bind the trial court on remand, and generally bind this Court should the case 
return on appeal after remand. [Citations omitted] The doctrine was 
developed to promote the obedience of inferior courts as well as "to avoid the 
delays and difficulties involved in repetitious contentions and reconsideration 
of rulings on matters previously decided in the same case." [Citation omitted]. 
31 P.2d at 546. See also, Corbett v. Fitzgerald, 709 P.2d 384 (Utah 1985). 
Michels' arguments based on the supposed extraterritorial effect of the 1984 tax 
sale involving the Subject Property are purely legal (by their own admission, Michels 
assert these as "questions] of law . . . [to be] reviewed by the Appeals Court under 
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'correctness' standard" - Appellant's Brief at pp. 3-4). Had this Court deemed the 
arguments persuasive, it would have reversed the trial court's 2001 ruling, and directed 
entry of judgment in favor of Michels. Instead, it sent the case back on an unrelated issue 
of fact, and on that issue only. Upon remand, the trial court carried out its mandate from 
this Court to the letter. It did not revisit the legal questions raised incident to Michels' 
prior appeal, as it had not been directed to do so. Michels should not be permitted to 
resuscitate a rejected legal argument as part of a second appeal, and assign error to the 
trial court's failure to entertain it on remand where it was not sent back for further 
consideration after the first appeal. 
Even if it is assumed that this Court did not intend to resolve Michels' challenge to 
the 1984 tax sale's validity, the decision not to revisit the matter was clearly within the 
discretion of the trial court. When issues are left open by an appellate decision the trial 
court has discretion how to deal with such issues as it sees fit. See Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. 
v. Kurzet, 945 P.2d 180(Ut. App. 1997). For this Court to assign reversible error to the 
lower court's decision not to revisit the validity of the 1984 tax sale, where the presumed 
validity of that sale was the only basis upon which the issue on remand made any sense, 
would be nonsensical. The trial court was clearly within its discretion. 
C. The 1984 tax sale was not an attempt, by Utah County, to exert taxing 
jurisdiction over property lying outside of its boundaries, as the Subject 
Property was properly located in, and taxable by, Utah County in 1984. 
Even were the validity of the 1984 tax sale properly before this Court, Michels' 
argument far overstates the issue. They attempt to bootstrap a clerical error in the Utah 
County Recorder's Office into a jurisdictional crisis between Salt Lake and Utah Counties 
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over which entity had proper taxing power. Michels do not have standing to raise such a 
challenge. Neither does any such conflict or crisis exist. As the Stipulated Facts 
submitted by the parties (R. 622-630) established, everyone - Utah County, Salt Lake 
County, and all participants in the 1984 tax sale process - believed the property to be 
located in Utah County. Before 1995, Utah County was the only taxing entity. Had Salt 
Lake County been assessing a portion of the property, and going unpaid, Richard 
Christenson could (and likely would) have attended a tax sale for any portion of the 
property lying within Salt Lake County. But at the time of the tax sale (and for more than 
a decade thereafter), no one was aware of any inaccuracy in the Utah County (or, 
presumedly, the Salt Lake County) survey. Rather, the Subject Property was included on 
the Utah County tax rolls, and wholly taxed by Utah County, in 1984 - and indeed until 
1995. Only in that year did a joint survey between Utah and Salt Lake Counties uncover 
the fact that certain section corner markers had been mislocated. The resulting 
corrections to those placements edged one comer of the Subject Property over the county 
line into Salt Lake County. The effect of the 1995 survey was the equivalent of a 
relocation of the Subject Property such that a portion thereof became located in, and 
subject to taxation by, Salt Lake County. To use the 1995 redetermination of the Subject 
Property's location as a device for invalidating, nunc pro tunc, a 1984 tax deed would not 
only do violence to the applicable statute of limitations (see below), but would ignore 
reality completely. 
The Court is urged, in this regard, to consider the practical implications of any 
attempt to assail a 1984 tax deed on the grounds urged by Michels herein. Section 
704409v1 39 
corners, quarter corners, boundary lines, and even county lines were first established in 
Utah through survey techniques employed by settlers in the mid-19th Century. 21st 
Century surveying methods (including global positioning satellite technology) have 
encountered, and will likely continue to encounter, countless surveying errors in the 
original settlers' efforts to lay out the Wasatch Front - errors which, in some instances, 
are off by more than a mile. Were every tax deed encompassing a corner of property 
relocated (years later) such that it falls in some part outside the boundaries of the taxing 
county to be hereafter forever assailable, district courts would be endlessly at the task of 
unraveling decades-old tax conveyances and titles4. 
Michels rely on Baxter v. Utah Dept. of Transportation, 783 P.2d 1045 (Ct. App. 
Utah 1989) (Appellants' Brief at pp. 42-48). But Baxter did not deal with a clerical 
survey error at all; certainly it did not hold that such an error, discovered eleven years 
after the fact, mandated invalidation of a tax sale. The court in Baxter dealt (by 
agreement of the parties) with only one issue: whether the county line between Davis and 
Weber Counties had shifted to the south of the property at issue due to a change in the 
center channel of the Weber River.5 The Court held that the county line was established 
by the territorial legislature in 1855, and had remained fixed since that time, not following 
subsequent course changes of the river. Based on this analysis, the Court concluded that 
the property at issue in that case had not moved from Davis to Weber County. Since this 
4It is just this sort of problem, in fact, which lay at the heart of the four-year statute of 
repose addressed at subpoint D, below. 
5With respect to the statute of limitations question as dealt with in Baxter, see subpoint D, 
below. 
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was the sole issue presented by the parties, the Court reversed and remanded the case to 
the trial court with the ruling that the plaintiffs tax deed was valid. 
The issue before the trial court in this case did not deal with any claimed relocation 
of the Salt Lake/Utah County line, but with an error in locating the Subject Property with 
respect thereto. Michels effectively ask the Court to decide whether, due to a survey error 
dating back to statehood, a 1984 tax conveyance of property thought to be entirely within 
Utah County, but discovered in 1995 to encroach at one corner over the Salt Lake County 
line, must fail ab initio. TWN submits that the validity of the tax sale must be upheld on 
the undisputed fact that, in 1984, the property was in Utah County. The 1995 resurvey, 
while it did not move the county line, effectively relocated the Subject Property in 
relation thereto by more accurately determining the location of section comers long 
believed to place the Subject Property within Utah County. Due to the revised survey 
information, a small comer of the Subject Property (as well as, presumedly, portions of 
many other properties adjacent to the county line) was determined to lie over the county 
line. As the trial court properly observed at one point, such errors are, (to say the least), 
common in a day when global positioning and laser technology is used to revisit 19th 
Century surveys. Michels5 invitation is effectively to expand Baxter to the point of 
invalidating every tax sale since statehood where such a subsequent resurvey reveals a 
county line encroachment. 
At the time of the 1984 tax sale forming the root of TWN's title, then, the Subject 
Property was within Utah County's boundaries according to the reasonable interpretation 
- by both counties - of the proper location of the section comer and quarter markers to 
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which its description related, and their position vis-a-vis the county line. Conveyance of 
the property to Richard Christenson by Utah County in 1984 was therefore wholly valid. 
D. Any challenge to the validity of Utah County's 1984 tax deed to Richard 
Christenson is barred by the applicable statute of repose. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-5.1 through 5.3 have, since 1957, been interpreted to 
impose a four-year statute of limitations on any challenge to title to real property derived 
from a tax sale, unless the challenger was in possession of the property during the four 
years following the tax sale. Those provisions read in their entirety as follows: 
No action for the recovery of real property or for the possession thereof shall 
be maintained, unless the plaintiff or his predecessor was seized or possessed 
of such property within seven years from the commencement of such action; 
provided, however, that with respect to actions or defenses brought or 
interposed for the recovery or possession of or to quiet title or determine the 
ownership of real property against the holder of a tax title to such property, no 
such action or defense shall be commenced or interposed more than four years 
after the date of the tax deed, conveyance, or transfer creating such tax title 
unless the person commencing or interposing such action or defense or his 
predecessor has actually occupied or been in possession of such property 
within four years prior to the commencement or interposition of such action or 
defense or within one year from the effective date of this amendment. 
No action or defense for the recovery or possession of real property or to quiet 
title or determine the ownership thereof shall be commenced or interposed 
against the holder of a tax title after the expiration of four years from the date 
of the sale, conveyance or transfer of such tax title to any county, or directly to 
any other purchase thereof at any public or private tax sale and after the 
expiration of one year from the date of this act. Provided, however, that this 
section shall not bar any action or defense by the owner of the legal title to 
such property where he or his predecessor has actually occupied or been in 
actual possession of such property within four years from the commencement 
or interposition of such action or defense. And provided further, that this 
section shall not bar any defense by a city or town, to an action by the holder 
of a tax title, to the effect that such city or town holds a lien against such 
property which is equal or superior to the claim of the holder of such tax title. 
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# * # * * 
(1) The term "tax title" as used in Section 78-12-5.2 and Section 59-2-1364, 
and the related amended Sections 78-12-5, 78-12-7, and 78-12-12, means any 
title to real property, whether valid or not, which has been derived through or 
is dependent upon any sale, conveyance, or transfer of property in the course 
of a statutory proceeding for the liquidation of any tax levied against the 
property whereby the property is relieved from a tax lien. 
(2) The word "action" as used in these sections includes counterclaims and 
cross-complaints and all civil actions wherein affirmative relief is sought. 
In 1957, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the foregoing provisions to impose a 
four-year statute of limitations on challenges to tax titles when the challenger had not 
been in possession of the property during any of the four years following the tax sale. In 
Peterson v. Callister, 313 P.2d 814 (Utah 1957), the plaintiff sought to acquire title to a 
parcel of property in San Juan County which had been passed down to him through a 
series of invalid conveyances following a tax sale in 1926. The court agreed with the 
defendant that the conveyances had been insufficient to pass legal title to the plaintiff; 
nevertheless, the court held for the plaintiff on the basis of the statute of limitations. 
Observing that the defendant had not been in possession of the property during any of the 
four years immediately following the tax sale, the court held that, according to the 
manifest intention of the legislature in enacting 78-12-5.1 through 5.3, no claim to 
challenge the validity of the tax title could be mounted: 
[W]e believe the legislature had in mind a four-year statute of limitations 
barring claims against tax titles, which four-year period dated from the 
initiation of the tax title, during which period any claimant against tax title 
must have had possession of the property to protect any claim he might have. 
313 P.2d 816 (emphasis added). 
In 1981, the court again addressed the time limit for challenging the validity of tax 
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titles. In the case of Frederiksen v. La Fleur, 632 P.2d 827 (Utah 1981), record title 
holders of real property located in Salt Lake County challenged the validity of title 
claimed by the plaintiffs through a tax sale in 1970. The lower court held that the tax sale 
had been invalid, and therefore had conveyed no proper title; that since the tax purchasers 
had no valid claim to the property themselves, they had no basis to assert a statute of 
limitations defense thereon; and that the record title holders were entitled to a 
presumption of possession, thereby defeating the language of the statute of limitations. 
The Supreme Court reversed on all grounds, holding that plaintiffs' tax title was validated 
by Utah Code Ann. §§78-12-5.1 to 5.3. Concerning the history of those sections, the 
court began by observing that tax titles had traditionally been assailed by legal decisions 
on a variety of technical grounds, giving rise to express legislative protection in the State 
of Utah: 
In order to give increased stability to tax titles and thereby augment the 
revenues of state and local governments, in 1951 the Utah Legislature enacted 
a special statute of limitations applicable to tax titles. Sections 78-12-5.1-5.3. 
Section 78-12-5.1 provides, inter alia, that no action for the recovery or 
possession of or to quiet title to real property may be commenced against the 
holder of a tax title more than four years after the date of the tax deed, 
conveyance, or transfer creating the tax title, unless the person commencing 
the action has "actually occupied or been in possession" of the disputed 
property within four years of the commencement of the action.. . . Section 
78-12-5.3 defines "tax title" in the preceding sections as "any title to real 
property, whether valid or not, which has been derived through a tax sale." 
632 P.2d at pp. 828-829. As in Peterson, The Supreme Court expressly acknowledged 
that plaintiffs' chain of title was defective and that the tax sale was therefore invalid; 
nevertheless, the court held plaintiffs eligible to invoke the statute of limitations: 
Sections 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2 bar actions or defenses against "the 
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holder of a tax title." Section 78-12-5.3 defines "tax title" as "any title to real 
property, whether valid or not" derived from a tax sale. 
Our legislature could hardly have expressed itself more clearly. This 
Court has often cited and applied Section 78-12-5.3 to permit holders of 
invalid or questionable tax titles to claim protection under the special 
limitations statute, [citations]. We see no reason to depart from these 
precedents or to reject the plain meaning of the statute. We therefore hold that 
these tax purchasers may avail themselves of the special statute of limitations 
regardless of the invalidity of their tax title, or their inability to establish an 
affirmative claim to title apart from their tax title. 
632 P.2d at p. 831 (emphasis in original). 
In Shelledy v. Lore, 836 P.2d 786 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court again 
affirmed the sanctity of a tax title (as defined at 78-12-5.3) at any time after four years 
from the date of the tax sale. In that action, the named defendants claimed title to the 
Subject Property in Salt Lake County through a tax sale (which ironically, occurred in 
1984); plaintiffs claimed that defendants' tax title was invalid, as tax liens assessed 
against the property for 1981 were illegal under the doctrine of sovereign immunity (the 
Utah Small Business Administration having acquired title to the property in 1981). 
The Supreme Court upheld the lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
the tax title holders. Again, while acknowledging that the SBA enjoyed sovereign 
immunity during its ownership of the property, the court observed that the four-year 
limitations period was dispositive: 
Our statutory definition of "tax title" is, in relevant part: 
"Tax title" . . . means any title to real property, whether valid or not, 
which has been derived through or is dependent upon any sale, conveyance, or 
transfer of property in the course of a statutory proceeding for the liquidation 
of any tax levied against the property whereby the property is relieved from a 
tax lien. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-5.3 (emphasis added). To give full effect to 
the above statute, it makes no difference if the tax title is valid. Once the four-
year statute of limitations has run, the tax title cannot be attacked. 
836 P.2d at p.790 (emphasis in original). 
In this case, it was stipulated that in 1984 (and for years thereafter), Utah County 
had long been assessing taxes against the Subject Property in its entirety - and that the 
1984 tax sale was conducted "in the course of a statutory proceeding for the liquidation of 
any tax levied against the property whereby the property is relieved from a tax lien". 
Even setting aside the question of whether the inclusion, in the property transferred, of 
one corner which was thereafter identified to lie outside of Utah county impacted the tax 
sale in any way (see above), the most that Michels can assert is that, as to that portion of 
the property so affected, TWN's tax title is somehow invalid. The Utah Legislature has 
stated outright that, valid or not, tax title may not be assailed at any time after four years 
from the date of the tax sale, in order to permit some measure of stability of tax titles. 
Michels have no meaningful response to this. They attempt only an unsupported 
distinction between "jurisdictional errors" and "procedural irregularities". The case law 
makes no such a distinction. 
By definition, a statute of limitations does not extinguish, or otherwise affect, the 
existence or nature of a legal right. It merely bars a legal challenge after a certain point in 
time. See Records v. Briggs, 882 P.2d 864 (UT App 1994). The purpose of time 
limitations on challenges to tax titles is to permit reliance upon legal title to real property 
after a certain period of time by barring challenges to that title - regardless of what merit 
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they might have had if timely pursued6. 
Given Michels' reliance on the Baxter decision, this Court should note that the 
statute of repose question was referenced with favor in a footnote to its decision therein. 
The ruling in Baxter, in fact, validated plaintiff s tax deed by holding that the original 
county line established by the territorial legislature in 1855 had not shifted with the 
meandering of the Weber River, thus obviating the necessity of addressing the limitations 
question; further, that (as this Court took pains to point out) neither of the parties before 
the lower court had raised the four-year statute, or relied upon its provisions.1 Even 
though the limitations question was not properly before it or germane to its decision, 
however, this Court offered the following dictum in its ruling: 
The strength and stability of title acquired by tax deed are aided by . . . the 
four-year statute of limitations barring untimely affirmative actions or 
defenses that challenge tax titles, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2 
(1987), which applies even if the tax title is invalid. 
783 P.2d at 1047 (emphasis added). As noted at subpoint C, above, Baxter involved a 
claim by the Utah Department of Transportation that (due to a shift in the center line of 
the Weber River) Davis County had conducted a tax sale of property located wholly in 
Weber County. Had the argument urged by plaintiffs in this action (that a "jurisdictional" 
6By Michels' definition, no statute of limitations or repose would be effective to defeat a 
challenge to any title to real property where the defendant could be shown not to have 
received valid conveyance of title ab initio. The entire purpose of Utah Code Ann. § 78-
12-6 (confining challenges to title of real property to seven years) would evaporate. 
7That a claim or defense based upon the statute of limitations is waived unless raised 
timely, see Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 13 Utah 2d 397, 375 P.2d 456 (1952); Staker v. 
Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983); Keller v. Southwood 
North Medical Pavilion, Inc., 959 P.2d 102 (Utah 1998). 
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defect in tax title is not barred by the four-year statute of limitation) been the law, this 
Court certainly would have mentioned this fact in connection with its discussion of the 
statute. 
Defendants have further attempted to buttress their position by offering an 
imaginary horrible: the taxing authority of one county deliberately attempting to sell, at 
tax sale, property located wholly within another remote county which also taxes the same 
property. There is no need to address the impact of the four-year statute of repose on 
such a hypothetical situation in this case8. Again, the Subject Property was, at all times 
prior to 1995, treated by all taxing entities as if wholly located within Utah County. The 
inadvertence discovered in 1995, which shifted section comers such that a small portion 
of the property lapped over into Salt Lake County, does not even rise to the level of 
"procedural irregularity" indicated in most cases dealing with the issue. 
TWN submits, in fact, that this case presents precisely the sort of inadvertence by 
county land surveyors that the statute of limitations was enacted to remedy. Were 
Michels permitted to disregard the limitations period, and attack a 1984 tax deed because 
- unknown to the taxing entity at the time - one corner of the property would in 1995 be 
relocated such that it lapped over a county line, unknown numbers of tax titles would be 
placed in jeopardy. Should the Court accept Michels' argument concerning the 
"jurisdictional" restrictions on the statute of repose, and rule that Christenson's tax title is 
8Such a circumstance would of necessity invoke a constitutional challenge by the affected 
counties themselves, something which neither Salt Lake nor Utah Counties has asserted 
here. 
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still assailable by a remote grantee after more than 15 years, the owner of every parcel of 
real property abutting a county line in the state of Utah should be put on notice that, if a 
tax sale of his or her parcel exists anywhere in the chain of title, regardless of date, the 
validity of his or her title to that property is now in jeopardy, should a present or future 
resurvey of that property call any prior survey into question. Acceptance of defendants' 
argument in this case would keep both the courts and the title companies in Utah very 
busy for a long time. 
E. The language of the tax deed does not restrict its efficacy to Utah 
County, 
By law, a metes and bounds description in a deed is operative to convey all the 
property lying within the boundaries so established, and the metes and bounds description 
takes precedent over other, more general descriptive terms (even if in conflict with the 
metes and bounds description) where such is clearly the intent of the grantor. In 
particular, a failure to designate the correct county in which property is located does not 
defeat the legal sufficiency of the description provided the metes and bounds properly tie 
the property to a valid point of beginning located with respect to a proper range and 
township. See, generally, Casner (ed), American Law of Property, §§12.115-12.122; 23 
Am.Jur.2d Deeds, §51 and 59. 
The language of the tax deed at issue here clearly does not intentionally limit its 
effect to only that portion of the metes and bounds description determined, eleven years 
after the fact, to be located within Utah County. Parol evidence in the form of the 
Stipulated Facts now before the Court clearly establish that, at the time the tax deed 
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issued, all parties believed that the entire parcel was located within Utah County. The 
intent of the parties to the deed, therefore, was to convey all 83 acres enclosed within the 
metes and bounds description. 
CONCLUSION 
During oral argument of their first appeal from the trial court's ruling quieting title 
to the Subject Property in TWN, Michels stoutly maintained that "all [they were] asking 
was [their] day in court" to challenge the capacity in which Richard A. Christenson 
executed the 1985 Quitclaim Deed to Zions First National Bank. Michels' wish was 
granted by this Court's prior order of remand. They had their day in court, and they lost 
again. Now they are back, not only to complain that the Fourth District Court abused its 
discretion in considering evidence speaking directly to the issue on remand, but also to re-
urge their entire panoply of prior arguments - including those never properly preserved 
on appeal, and those forming no part of this Court's prior ruling on remand. 
It is time for this to stop. At some point, the legal process needs to give parties 
closure and finality. Ahab needs to stop chasing the whale. 
For the reasons set out above, it is submitted that the lower court's ruling in this 
matter be affirmed. 
DATED: July 22, 2005. 
;1 
/ 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
By 
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Subject to Assignment to the Court of 
Appeals 
Case No. 20010999-SC 
Appellants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby submit the following Docketing 
Statement pursuant to Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
1. DATE(S) OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT OR ORDER APPEALED FROM: 
Appellants have appealed the trial court's Order of Summary Judgment executed August 24, 
2000, and a Memorandum Decision and Order dated November 8,2001. Such Judgment and Order 
have flxlly resolved all issues of the case and are "final" judgments and orders. 
8. ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
A. Was the trial court in error in refusing to consider parole evidence to interpret the 
terms of an ambiguous Quit-Claim Deed? This is a question of law and will be 
reviewed by the appeals court under a standard of "correctness". 
B. May a county assess taxes on real property located in an adjacent county and hold a 
tax sale following non-payment of the assessed taxes? This is a question of law and 
will be reviewed by the appeals court under a standard of "correctness". 
C. Was the trial court in error in validating (by virtue of a four-year statute of limitations) 
a Tax Deed issued by Utah County relating to real property located in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah? This is a question of law and will be reviewed by the appeals 
court under a standard of "correctness". 
9. DETERMINATION OF CASE BY SUPREME COURT: 
This case is subject to assignment to the Court of Appeals. 
10. DETERMINATIVE LAW: 
With respect to the issue of review of ambiguous deeds, the determinative law in Utah is that 
parole evidence may be considered to interpret ambiguous documents (including deeds), as evidenced 
by the following authorities and cases: 
23 Am.Jur 2d. "Deeds", Section 40, page 103 
Wade v. Dorius, 173 P.2d 564, 52 Utah 310 (1918) 
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576 East South Temple 
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Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
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Vincent C. Rampton. Esq. (2684) 
Ross I. Romero, Esq. (7771) 
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MCDONOUGH 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final decision of the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, 
State of Utah. Appeals from final decisions can be made as a matter of right to the Utah Supreme 
Court pursuant to § 78-2-2(3 )(j) of the Utah Code Annotated. The Notice of Appeal was timely filed 
with the Utah Supreme Court on December 5, 2001. On February 26, 2002, and pursuant to 
§ 78-2-2(4) of the Utah Code Annotated, the Utah Supreme Court exercised its discretion to transfer 
this case to the Utah Court of Appeals. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
case pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(j) of the Utah Code Annotated. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Was the trial court in error in refusing to consider parole evidence to interpret the 
terms of an ambiguous Quit-Claim Deed? This is a question of law and should be 
reviewed by this Court under a standard of "correctness".1 
B. May a county assess taxes on real property located in an adjacent county and hold a 
tax sale following non-payment of the assessed taxes? This is a question of law and 
should be reviewed by this Court under a standard of "correctness".2 
C. Was the trial court in error in applying a four-year statute of limitations to a 
jurisdictional challenge to a Tax Deed issued by Utah County when mistakenly and 
erroneously selling real property located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah? This is 
1
 Upon review of a summary judgment, this court will liberally construe the facts and view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the defendants and against the plaintiff. Lucky Seven Rodeo 
Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah App. 1988). No deference is accorded the trial court's 
ruling and legal conclusions. Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power and Water, Inc., 
789 P.2d 24 (Utah 1990). 
2
 See footnote 1. 
a question of law and should be reviewed by this Court under a standard of 
"correctness".3 
RULES RELEVANT FOR REVIEW 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure relating to summary judgment is relevant to 
the issues of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The underlying issue of this case is a determination of the actual owner of a tract of eighty-
three (83) acres of undeveloped real property located at the top of the mountain (sometimes known 
as Traverse Ridge) between Draper and Highland cities. The property lies partially in both Salt Lake 
and Utah counties. (Addendum G, R. 755.) 
Appellants acquired ownership of the property in 1993, having purchased the same at a 
foreclosure sale held by Zions Bank. Appellees claim ownership of the property pursuant to a 1998 
Quit-Claim Deed from Richard A. Christenson. (Addendum C.) 
The root of title flows from the effect of a 1984 Tax Deed from Utah County following a tax 
sale of the property. (Addendum A) 
On July 16,1999, Appellee filed an Action to Quiet Title in the Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County seeking a declaration of such court that Appellee was the owner of the property 
under its 1998 Quit Claim Deed. (R. 9). Appellants defended the action by alleging their ownership 
pursuant to the 1993 foreclosure sale and resulting Trustee's Deed. (R. 15, 326). 
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Company to which quitclaim deed was executed, 
which occurred several years after the parcel was 
apparently purchased by another party, brought 
action to quiet title. The Fourth District Court, 
Provo Department, James R. Taylor, J., granted 
summary judgment for the company based upon its 
belief that the original purchaser had acquired only 
trust interest in the property, which actually did not 
exist. The original purchaser appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Orme, J., held that although the deed 
conveying the property to the original purchaser 
referred to the grantor as "trustee," this unexplained 
reference did not mean the instrument conveyed 
only the grantor's trust interest. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Appeal and Error €==>863 
30k863 Most Cited Cases 
On appeal from summary judgment, appellate court 
conducts inquiry similar to that conducted by the 
trial court; the appellate court asks whether there 
are material fact issues, and whether the trial court 
correctly applied the law. 
[2] Deeds €==>31 
120k31 Most Cited Cases 
Doctrine of "descriptio personae" refers to the use 
of words or phrases merely to identify or point out 
the person intended, and not as an intimation that 
the language in connection with which it occurs is 
to apply to him only in the technical character 
which might appear to be indicated by the word. 
[3] Deeds €==>31 
120k31 Most Cited Cases 
The concept of "descriptio personae" applies to the 
identification of parties on real property deeds. 
[4] Trusts €=^25(1) 
390k25(l) Most Cited Cases 
Unexplained reference in real property deed to 
grantor as "trustee" did not mean the instrument 
conveyed only the grantor's trust interest; there was 
never any indication that trust existed or was being 
created, and moreover, courts almost always viewed 
merely as descriptio personae similar unexplained 
references to the grantee as "trustee," and the 
distinction between grantor and grantee was 
immaterial. 
[5] Trusts €==>25(1) 
390k25(l) Most Cited Cases 
Unexplained use of "trustee" on real property deed 
does not, absent other circumstances suggesting 
creation or existence of trust, create trust or 
implicate only trust interest; the deed should be 
viewed as if "trustee" did not appear. 
[6] Trusts €=^25(1) 
390k25(l) Most Cited Cases 
[6] Trusts €==>43(3) 
390k43(3) Most Cited Cases 
Trustee may dispose of trust property in his or her 
name as trustee, but this intent must be made clearer 
than simply placing the unadorned word "trustee" 
after his or her name; language such as "in my 
capacity as trustee" should appear on the deed, 
although one may rely upon extrinsic evidence to 
show that trust was intended. U.C.A.1953, 
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**1 This appeal involves an action to quiet title to 
an eighty-three acre parcel of land that lies along 
the border between Utah County and Salt Lake 
County. It turns on the sudden appearance in a 
chain of title of *1032 the term "trustee." We 
reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
**2 As of 1984, Zions Bank was the record owner 
of the parcel at issue in this case. However, Zions 
Bank became delinquent in paying its property 
taxes on the land, so Utah County sold the parcel at 
a tax sale in 1984. [FN1] Richard Christenson 
purchased the property at the sale, and accordingly 
he received title to the parcel. The grantee on the 
deed was listed as "Richard Christenson." 
FN1. Utah County sold the entire parcel, 
even the portion in Salt Lake County, 
because at the time of the sale, it was 
thought the entire parcel was within Utah 
County. Not until approximately 1995, 
when a new survey was conducted, was it 
discovered that part of the parcel was 
actually in Salt Lake County. 
**3 In 1985, without any intervening transaction 
appearing of record, Mr. Christenson executed a 
quitclaim deed to the parcel to Zions Bank, which 
reimbursed him the amount he paid at the tax sale. 
The grantor was identified on that deed as "Richard 
A. Christenson, Trustee." Zions Bank sold the land 
to Franklin Financial, a corporation that was wholly 
owned by Mr. Christenson, in 1986. Zions Bank 
financed this sale, and when Franklin Financial 
defaulted on its mortgage payments, Zions Bank 
held a foreclosure sale on the land. Defendants were 
the high bidders at the foreclosure sale, which took 
place in 1993, and received an appropriate deed in 
due course. 
**4 However, in 1998, Mr. Christenson executed 
another quitclaim deed for the parcel, this time to 
Plaintiff. The grantor named on this deed was 
"Richard A. Christenson." 
**5 In 1999, Plaintiff brought this action to quiet 
title on the parcel. Both sides moved for summary 
judgment, and the trial court granted it in Plaintiffs 
favor. The trial court's order does not explain the 
rationale underlying its decision. However, the 
parties agree that its rationale was that because the 
1985 deed to Zions Bank was signed "Richard A. 
Christenson, Trustee " (emphasis added), the deed 
did not convey Mr. Christenson's personal interest 
in the property, which was the interest he had 
acquired at the 1984 tax sale. Rather, as a matter of 
law the 1985 deed conveyed only whatever interest 
Mr. Christenson held on behalf of an unnamed trust, 
which was apparently nothing. [FN2] Defendants 
now appeal the grant of summary judgment. 
FN2. At oral argument both sides agreed 
that Mr. Christenson likely did not actually 
hold any interest in the property on behalf 
of a trust. No explanation was offered as to 
why Mr. Christenson would cause a 
corporation he owned to acquire title to the 
property from Zions Bank for a 
considerable sum if he believed Zions had 
actually bought nothing from him and thus 
had nothing to convey to the corporation. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] **6 "Summary judgment is appropriate only 
when no genuine issues of material fact exist and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. Because entitlement to summary judgment 
is a question of law, we accord no deference to the 
trial court's resolution of the legal issues presented." 
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Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 
264, 266 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted). Thus, 
"[o]ur inquiry on review of a summary judgment is 
similar to the inquiry conducted by the trial court: 
are there material issues of fact to be litigated, and 
did the trial court correctly apply the governing 
law?" Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc., 
740 P.2d 1304, 1308 (Utah 1987). 
**7 To determine whether "the trial court correctly 
appl[ied] the governing law" in this case, id, we 
must answer the following question: Does a 
grantor's unexplained placing of the word "trustee" 
next to his or her name on a real property deed 
result, as a matter of law, in a conveyance of only a 
trust interest? As explained below, we answer that 
question in the negative. [FN3] 
FN3. Lest the reader be tempted to view 
this as a "notice" case, wherein a 
subsequent bona fide purchaser for value 
takes title if they record their deed first, see 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-103 (2000), we 
clarify that such an issue is not present in 
this case. The disagreement in this case 
concerns what interest the 1985 deed 
conveyed—Mr. Christenson's entire interest 
or only his "trustee" interest. No one 
disputes that Defendants, who are the 
successors in interest to the first purchaser 
(Zions Bank) and who properly recorded 
their deed, are the rightfiil owners of 
whatever interest the 1985 deed conveyed. 
* 1033 ANALYSIS 
[2] **8 Although Defendants argue in general 
terms that the unexplained appearance of the word 
"trustee" creates ambiguity on the face of the deed 
from Mr. Christenson to Zions Bank, the thrust of 
their argument brings them within the doctrine 
known as "descriptio personae." This term is 
defined as "the use of a word or phrase merely to 
identify or point out the person intended and not as 
an intimation that the language in connection with 
which it occurs is to apply to him only in the 
technical character which might appear to be 
indicated by the word." Dann v. Team Bank, 788 
S.W.2d 182, 184 (Tex.App.1990). See also 
Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Peck, 195 Cal.App.3d 803, 
240 Cal.Rptr. 911, 913 (1987) (" ' "Where a writing 
in the nature of a contract is signed by a person, and 
contains apt words to bind him personally, the fact 
that to such signature is added such words as 
'trustee,' 'agent,' 'treasurer,' 'president,' and the like 
does not change the character of the person so 
signing, but is considered as merely descriptive of 
him." ' ") (quoting Richer v. B-W Acceptance Corp., 
349 F.2d 892, 894 (10th Cir.1965) (quoting Ellis v. 
Stone, 21 N.M. 730, 158 P. 480, 483 (1916))); 
Klutts Resort Realty, Inc. v. Down'Round Dev. 
Corp., 268 S.C. 80, 232 S.E.2d 20, 24 (1977) 
(defining "descriptio personae " as "a term 
descriptive of the person rather than the relationship 
in which he signs the agreement"); 14 Richard R. 
Powell, Powell on Real Property § 
81A.04[l][a][iv][E], at 81A-42 (Michael Allan 
Wolf ed., 2002) (describing "descriptio personae " 
as "[c]ertain terms sometimes added to a person's 
name [that] are merely descriptive matter intended 
to clarify the identity of the person, but ... their use 
or non-use should generally play no part in the 
validity of the conveyance"). 
**9 The Utah Supreme Court validated the 
descriptio personae concept for Utah courts in 
Boise Cascade Corp. v. Stonewood Development 
Corp., 655 P.2d 668 (Utah 1982). In that case, a 
Stonewood corporate officer who had signed a loan 
guaranty agreement as "Vice President" sought to 
absolve himself of personal liability on the guaranty 
agreement. He claimed that since he had written the 
words "Vice President" next to his signature on the 
agreement, his signature was in a representative 
capacity and bound only the corporation and not 
him personally. The trial court disagreed and 
granted summary judgment to the creditor, and the 
Utah Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held: 
The "V-Pres." following [the officer's] signature 
on the agreement is a matter of description 
(descriptio personae), not of capacity to bind a 
different principal obligor.... Stonewood 
admittedly was indebted to Plaintiff. [The 
officer] admittedly guaranteed its payment, and 
there are no counter-affidavits that lend any doubt 
as to the fact of personal, not representative, 
liability. 
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Id. at 669. Accord Appliance & Heating Supply, 
Inc. v. Telaroli, 682 P.2d 867, 868 & n. 1 (Utah 
1984). Utah courts have held similarly on other 
occasions as well. See, e.g., Proctor v. Insurance 
Co., 714 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Utah 1986) (holding that 
an accident insurance company properly paid 
decedent's second wife rather than his first wife 
because even though the second marriage was 
illegal, the " 'designation [in the insurance policy] 
as the wife of insured is descriptive only, and it is 
immaterial whether or not she is ... his lawful wife' 
") (quoting 46 C.J.S. Insurance § 1160 (1946), 
which is updated with slightly different language at 
46A C.J.S. Insurance § 1419 (1993)); Travelers 
Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 531 P.2d 484, 485-86 (Utah 1975) 
(holding that a father's divorce-decree mandate to 
name his "three minor children" as contingent 
beneficiaries in a life insurance policy did not 
expire when the children reached adulthood because 
the "minor children" designation "was merely 
descriptive of their status at the time [and] was not 
meant to make them contingent beneficiaries only 
during their minority"); Southwick v. Leone {In re 
Estate of Leone ), 860 P.2d 973, 976 (Utah 
Ct.App.1993) (holding that language identifying the 
beneficiary of a pay-on-death account as the 
"spouse of the protected person" did *1034 not 
create a condition precedent that the spouse remain 
married; rather, the phrase was "merely a 
non-restrictive adjective phrase meant to identify 
the individual"). 
[3] **10 It has long been recognized that the 
concept of descriptio personae applies to the 
identification of parties on real property deeds. See, 
e.g., Molina v. Ramirez, 15 Ariz. 249, 138 P. 17, 19 
(1914) ("The description of the grantor as the 
'administratrix[ ]' ... may be treated as descriptio 
personam, and of no effect. She acted, so far as her 
interest in the property was concerned, in her 
individual capacity when she executed the deed."); 
Hodgson v. Dorsey, 230 Iowa 730, 298 N.W. 895, 
896-98 (Iowa 1941) (holding that the word "trustee" 
next to a grantee's name on a deed was descriptio 
personae and citing various cases that held 
similarly); Owen v. Ellis, 64 Mo. 77, 88 (1876) 
(holding that the word "executrix" appearing next to 
the grantor's name was "mere descriptio personae, 
mere surplusage, and the conveyance would operate 
as well without [it] as with [it]"). 
[4] **11 As for the question of whether the 
unexplained placement of the word "trustee" on a 
real property deed may rightly be categorized as 
descriptio personae, almost every court that has 
addressed this issue has addressed it in the context 
of the word appearing next to the grantee's name, 
not the grantor's name as in our case. See, e.g., 
Hodgson, 298 N.W. at 895; Gammarino v. 
Hamilton County Bd. of Revision, 84 Ohio St.3d 
155, 702 N.E.2d 415, 416 (1998) (per curiam). 
Therefore, the question that most courts have 
confronted is whether the deed created a trust and 
vested title in the grantee only as a trustee or 
whether it vested title in the grantee personally. 
Such courts have almost universally held that the 
word "trustee," absent other circumstances, does not 
create a trust, but rather constitutes descriptio 
personae and conveys title to the grantee 
personally. See, e.g., Hodgson, 298 N.W. at 
896-98; Gammarino, 702 N.E.2d at 417-18 (relying 
partially on state statutory law but also on case law). 
See also Powell, supra, § 81A.04[l][a][iv][F], at 
81A-42 ("Most often the incidental and unexplained 
use of such terms as 'trustee' or 'agent' is ... 
considered to be merely descriptio personae and is 
insufficient to establish or create a trust or 
agency."). But see Neeley v. Intercity Mgmt. Corp., 
623 S.W.2d 942, 948 (Tex.App.1981) (holding that 
a deed created a trust, in part because the property 
was conveyed to a named trustee but also because 
multiple extraneous factors so suggested). 
[5] **12 The case at hand is slightly different from 
the opinions just cited because in our case it is the 
grantor, not the grantee, who is designated as 
"trustee." However, this distinction is immaterial. 
We see no logic in categorizing as descriptio 
personae the word "trustee" if it follows a grantee's 
name but giving the word enforceable meaning if it 
follows a grantor's name. Regardless of whose 
name the word follows, the principle must be the 
same: The unexplained use of the word "trustee" on 
a real property deed does not, absent other 
circumstances suggesting the creation or existence 
of a trust, create a trust or implicate only a trust 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
66 P.3d 1031 Page 5 
66 P.3d 1031,469 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 2003 UT App 70 
(Cite as: 66 P.3d 1031, 2003 UT App 70) 
interest. Therefore, in both contexts, the deed 
should be read and interpreted as if the word 
"trustee" were not there. 
**13 Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal, the 
only court of which we are aware that has recently 
faced the precise issue that we face today, came to 
the same conclusion. In Terry v. Zaffran, 483 So.2d 
526 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.), review denied, 492 So.2d 
1336 (Fla.1986), a property owner named Michael 
A. Taylor conveyed a parcel of land, signing the 
deed "Michael A. Taylor, as trustee." Id. at 527. 
Title to the parcel followed a chain subsequent to 
that deed, and the land was eventually mortgaged to 
appellant. Some months later, appellee obtained a 
judgment against Taylor. Appellee then "became 
the grantee of a sheriffs deed issued pursuant to a 
levy on the land to satisfy the judgment." Id. When 
appellee brought an action against appellant, the 
mortgagee, to quiet title to the property, the trial 
court ruled in appellee's favor, holding that since 
"Michael A. Taylor held title as an individual, the 
deed from him 'as trustee' was ineffectual to convey 
title to the [first purchaser]." Id. Thus, the trial 
court held that Taylor's personal interest in the 
property remained with him until appellee took it by 
virtue of the sheriffs deed. See id. Predictably, the 
appellate court reversed and held as follows: 
The addition of the words "as trustee" to the 
name of the grantor Michael A. Taylor *1035 
was merely "descriptio personae" of the person of 
the grantor and, as such, did not affect the validity 
of the conveyance of the interest held by the 
grantor nor did it limit the estate conveyed. In 
Florida today those words alone do not even 
charge a subsequent good faith purchaser or 
lender with the duty to inquire as to the rights of 
undisclosed trust beneficiaries and can be safely 
disregarded as surplusage. Accordingly, Michael 
A. Taylor having effectively conveyed all of his 
interest in the land in question prior to the date of 
the judgment against him, that judgment never 
became a lien on the land previously owned and 
conveyed by the judgment debtor. Thus, the 
sheriffs deed was invalid and had no effect on the 
lien interest held by appellant as mortgagee. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
[6] **14 Finally, we note that Utah Code Ann. § 
75-7-402(5) (1993) authorizes a trustee to dispose 
of trust property "in the name of the trustee as 
trustee." [FN4] In fact, that is exactly what 
Plaintiff claims occurred in the present case. 
However, we hold that a trustee's intent to do so 
must be made clearer than simply placing the 
unadorned word "trustee" after his or her name. 
[FN5] A trustee-grantor should include on the deed 
such language as "in my capacity as trustee for the 
XYZ trust." [FN6] Alternatively, as the Utah 
Supreme Court suggested in Boise Cascade Corp., 
a party-may resort to extrinsic evidence to show that 
a trust was, in fact, intended. See 655 P.2d at 669 
(suggesting that a counter-affidavit could have 
rebutted the presumption of descriptio personae 
and shown that the descriptive language was 
intended to bind the person in his representative 
capacity rather than in his individual capacity). 
Otherwise, the presumption of descriptio personae 
will apply, and the deed will operate as if the word 
"trustee" were not there. 
FN4. Although this subsection was not 
enacted until 1992, see Utah Code Ann. § 
75-7-402 amendment notes (1993), it is 
relevant to our decision today regarding 
the 1985 deed that Mr. Christenson 
conveyed to Zions Bank. The subsection 
specifies that it "applies to a trustee's 
exercise of trust powers both prior to and 
after the effective date of this subsection." 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-402(5) (1993). 
FN5. Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-409(2) 
(Supp.2002) provides: "If the terms of the 
trust are not made public [in a grant of real 
property to a person as trustee], a 
conveyance from the trustee is absolute in 
favor of purchasers for value who take the 
property without notice of the terms of the 
trust." That statute is not directly 
applicable to the present case because this 
case does not involve the situation 
anticipated by the statute, i.e., that "title to 
real property is granted to a person as 
trustee." Id. § 75-7-409(1). Even so, our 
decision today is consistent with the 
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statute's spirit: When parties wish to 
convey a trust interest, as opposed to a 
personal interest, they must be explicit and 
forthcoming about this intention if they 
hope to attain it. 
FN6. This phrase is intended only as an 
example of language that would be 
effective. We have no intention of 
resurrecting the long-deceased requirement 
that certain, precise phrases must appear 
on a deed to convey a particular interest. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-2 (2000) 
("The term 'heirs,' or other technical words 
of inheritance or succession, are not 
requisite to transfer a fee in real estate."); 
Haynes v. Hunt, 96 Utah 348, 354, 85 P.2d 
861, 864 (1939) ("We are not interested in 
the use of terms but we are in concepts, 
relationships and legal rights which for 
convenience are often described by the use 
of legal names or expressions."). 
CONCLUSION 
**15 We hold that the word "trustee" appearing 
next to Mr. Christenson's name on the 1985 deed to 
Zions Bank was not sufficient, by itself, to restrict 
the conveyance only to whatever interest Mr. 
Christenson held in trust. Therefore, we reverse the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand 
this case to the trial court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. [FN7] 
FN7. In addition to their principal 
argument in this case, Defendants argue 
that we should deem Utah County's 1984 
tax sale void ab initio because, as it was 
discovered in about 1995, part of the 
parcel is in Salt Lake County. See note 1, 
supra. Given our decision, we need not 
address this argument. 
**16 WE CONCUR: NORMAN H. JACKSON, 
Presiding Judge, and PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, 
Judge. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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The above entitled matter came on for trial before the Honorable Fred D. Howard, Fourth 
District Court Judge, on August 3 and 31, 2004. Originally, Judge Taylor granted summary 
judgment in favor of Plaintiff, which was reversed and remanded by the Utah Court of Appeals. See 
TWN, Inc. v. Michel, 2003 UT App 70, 66 P.3d 1031. On remand, the sole factual issue before the 
Court is whether, in executing the 1985 quitclaim deed to Zions Bank as "Richard A. Christenson, 
Trustee," Mr. Christenson intended to sign as trustee of a trust, thereby intending to convey the 
trust's interests in the subject property, or whether he intended to convey his own personal interest, 
adding the term "trustee" to his signature merely as "descriptio personae." Other issues previously 
raised by the parties have either been tried to this Court or rendered moot by the Court of Appeals' 
decision. 
The Court having heard the testimony of the parties, proffers of counsel, having reviewed 
the file and pleadings, and being fully advised in the premises, and for good cause appearing 
therefrom, hereby issues the following: 
BACKGROUND FACTS 
Plaintiff TWN, Inc. is a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. Defendants Uwe Michel and Ullrich Michel are individuals and residents of the State 
of Utah. The real property which is the subject of this action (subject property) is primarily located 
in Utah County, with a small portion in Salt Lake County, consisting of 83 acres. It was thought that 
the entire parcel was within Utah County until 1995, when a new survey was conducted, it was 
discovered that part of the parcel was actually in Salt Lake County. 
As of 1984, Zions Bank was the record owner of the subject property at issue in this case. 
However, Zions Bank became delinquent in paying its property taxes on the land, so Utah County 
sold the subject property at a tax sale in 1984. Richard Christenson purchased the property at the 
tax sale, and accordingly he received title to it. The grantee on the deed was listed as "Richard 
Christenson." 
In 1985, without any intervening transaction appearing on record, Mr. Christenson 
executed a quitclaim deed to the subject property to Zions Bank, which reimbursed him the amount 
he paid at the tax sale. The grantor was identified on that deed as "Richard A. Christenson, Trustee." 
Zions Bank sold their interest in the deed to Franklin Financial, a corporation that was wholly owned 
by Mr. Christenson, in 1986. Zions Bank financed this sale, and when Franklin Financial defaulted 
on its mortgage payment, Zions Bank held a foreclosure sale on the subject property. Defendants 
Page 2 of 7 
were the high bidders at the foreclosure sale, which took place in 1993, and received an appropriate 
deed in due course. 
In 1998, Mr. Christenson executed another quitclaim deed for the subject property, this 
time to Plaintiff. The grantor named on this deed was "Richard A. Christenson." In 1999, Plaintiff 
brought this action to quiet title on the subject property. Both sides moved for summary judgment, 
and Judge Taylor granted it in Plaintiffs favor finding that the 1985 deed conveyed only whatever 
interest Mr. Christenson held in behalf of an unnamed trust, which was apparently nothing. On 
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a determination of Mr. Christenson's intent, 
holding "that a trustee's intent to [dispose of trust property] must be made clearer than simply 
placing the unadorned word 'trustee' after his or her name." TWN, 2003 UT App 70 at f^ 14. The 
Court of Appeals directed that intent can be shown by the trustor-grantor "including] on the deed 
such language as 'in my capacity as trustee for the XYZ trust'" or by uresort[ing] to extrinsic 
evidence to show that a trust was, in fact, intended." Id. 
RULING 
The Court notes that the sole issue before it is whether Mr. Christenson, in executing the 
1985 quit-claim deed to Zions Bank as "Richard A. Christenson, Trustee," intended to convey the 
trust's interests or his personal interest in the subject property. See TWN, 2003 UT App 70 at ^ 15. 
The Court of Appeals found that the "unexplained use of the word 'trustee' on a real property deed 
does not, absent other circumstances suggesting the creation or existence of a trust, create a trust or 
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implicate only a trust interest." Id. at If 12. The Court of Appeals then held that a trustee may dispose 
of trust property by including on the deed such language as "in my capacity as trustee for the XYZ 
trust" or in the alternative, "a party may resort to extrinsic evidence to show that a trust was, in fact, 
intended." Id. at \ 14. The Court of Appeals cited to Boise Cascade Corporation v. Stonewood 
Development Corporation, 655 P.2d 668,669 (Utah 1982), wherein it was suggested that a counter-
affidavit may be sufficient to rebut the presumption of descriptio personae by showing that the 
descriptive language was intended to bind the person in his representative capacity rather than his 
individual capacity. Id. 
In citing Boise Cascade Corp., the Court of Appeals suggests that an affidavit explaining 
the use of the term "trustee" may be sufficient to rebut the presumption of descriptio personae if the 
affidavit shows that by using the term "Trustee," Mr. Christenson intended to restrict the conveyance 
only to the interest he held in trust and that he retained any personal interest he held in the property. 
At trial on remand, Plaintiff offered language from an affidavit of Mr. Christenson, signed 
and dated January714,1999. wherein Mr. Christenson averred that he reviewed the 1985 quit-claim 
deed to Zions Bank, and that "he signed said Quit Claim Deed as Trustee for Cape Trust to transfer 
the interest, if any, of Cape Trust in subject property, and not any personal interest in subject 
property." Mr. Christenson testified that he could not recall the circumstances surrounding his 
signing of the 1985 quit claim deed, but he testified that he was the sole trustee of Cape Trust and 
that he would not have put the word "trustee" next to his name if he intended to transfer his personal 
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interest in the subject property. Mr. Christenson also testified that it was not his custom to use 
"trustee" unless he was signing as a trustee. 
Defendants argued that Mr. Christenson's actions in a prior lawsuit, wherein he attempted 
to foreclose a lien against the subject property but never claimed a personal interest in the property, 
demonstrate that he had no remaining interest in the property. Considering the testimony of Mr. 
Christenson and all the evidence before the Court, the Court is unpersuaded by Defendants' 
argument. 
Following the direction and mandate from the Court of Appeals, the Court finds that the 
language of Mr. Christenson's affidavit and his testimony are dispositive of the issue as framed by 
the Court of Appeals. The Court is persuaded by such evidence that he was acting on behalf of Cape 
Trust when executing the quit claim deed. The evidence further proves that Mr. Christenson retained 
any personal interest which he held in and to the property after execution of the 1985 quit claim deed 
and that the only interest transferred in the quit claim deed was that of Cape Trust. Moreover, the 
Court is persuaded by Mr. Christenson's testimony that he would not have signed as "trustee" unless 
he was acting in behalf of Cape Trust. 
The Court, therefore, finds that the proper and legal chain of title continued with Mr. 
Christenson until 1998, when he conveyed his personal interest in the subject property to Plaintiff. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to an order of this Court quieting title in and to the property, free 
and clear of any claim of right, title or interest of Defendants. 
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Defendants assert that Plaintiffs claim is barred by claim preclusion resulting from a final 
order entered in the Third District Court. However, at the conclusion of the submission of the 
parties' motion for summary judgment pleadings, the pleadings were closed as to such arguments; 
and, therefore, pursuant to the "law of the case" doctrine, this Court is bound by previous decisions 
in prior stages of this litigation. See Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1995). The 
issue of claim preclusion not having been raised, the Court of Appeals did not address the issue and 
remanded this case on the sole issue as outlined above. Respectfully, the Court will not, therefore, 
reconsider this issue when Defendants should have previously raised it. 
Counsel for Plaintiff is directed to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
an Order consistent with this Ruling. 
Dated this /T& day of November, 2004. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF U T A H C O U N T Y 
STATE OF UTAH 
TWN, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UWE MICHEL, an individual, and 
ULLRICH MICHEL, an individual, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 990402593 
Judge Fred D Howard 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before The Honorable Fred D. Howard, Judge 
of the Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah County, State of Utah, on August 3 and 31, 2004, 
upon remand from the Utah Court of Appeals (TWN, Inc. v. Michel. 2003 UT App 70, 66 P.3d 
1031 (2003)). Plaintiff TWN, Inc. was represented by its counsel of record, Vincent C. Rampton 
and Ross I Romero of Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough, PC. Defendants Uwe and Ullrich 
Michel were represented by their counsel of record, Bruce J. Nelson of Nelson Christensen & 
Helsten. 
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The Court having heard the testimony of parties and witnesses, proffers of counsel, 
having reviewed the file, pleadings and submittals, heard and considered argument of counsel, 
and being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing, enters the following findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, order, and judgment. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff TWN, Inc. is a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. Defendants Uwe ("Shaun") Michel and Ullrich ("OHie") Michel are individuals 
and residents of the State of Utah. 
3. The real property which is the subject of this action consists of approximately 83 
acres of land located in the area commonly known as Traverse Ridge, more particularly described 
as follows: 
COMMENCING at a point West 1979 feet from the Northeast comer of the 
Northwest quarter of Section 15, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian; and running thence South 2630.3 feet; thence West 1374.6 feet; 
thence North 2630.3 feet; thence East 1374.6 feet to the point of beginning. 
("Subject Property") 
4. As of 1984, Zions Bank was the record owner of the Subject Property. 
5. In 1984, however, Zions Bank became delinquent in paying its property taxes on 
the Subject Property. 
6. In May of 1984, therefore. Utah County conducted an auditor's tax sale on the 
Subject Property for delinquent taxes. 
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7. The Subject Property was purchased at the tax sale by Richard A. Chrislenson as 
the successful bidder. 
8. An Auditor's Tax Deed dated June 29, 1984, was issued and recorded with the 
Utah County Recorder on July 18, 1984, as Entry No. 21303 in Book 2150 at Page 588. 
9. The named grantee on the 1984 Tax Deed was ''Richard Christenson"; this 
Richard Christenson and Richard A. Christenson are one and the same person, however. 
10. On September 12, 1985, without any intervening transaction appearing of record, 
a March 19, 1985 Quit-Claim Deed describing the Subject Property and a separate parcel of 
property in Salt Lake County, and naming Zions First National Bank as grantee, was recorded 
with the Office of the Utah County Recorder as Entry No. 26380 in Book 2245 at Page 405. 
11. The grantor on the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed to Zions Bank was identified as 
"Richard A. Christenson, trustee." 
12. Zions Bank then sold whatever interest it held in and to the Subject Property to 
Franklin Financial in 1986, taking back a Trust Deed thereon. 
13. Franklin Financial thereafter defaulted on payments to the Zions Bank, resulting 
in the conducting of a non-judicial foreclosure sale on April 13, 1993. 
14. Defendants Uwe and Ullrich Michel were the high bidders at the trustee sale. 
15. Defendants received a trustee's deed following the sale, which described both the 
Subject Property and a separate parcel in Salt Lake County. 
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16. Richard A. Christenson executed the March 19, 1985 Quit-Claim Deed, and 
delivered the same to Zions Bank, in his capacity as trustee for Cape Trust, a trust of which he 
was sole trustee. 
17. The purpose of the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed was to transfer the interest, if any, of 
Cape Trust in and to the property described in the Quit-Claim Deed, including the Subject 
Property. 
18. It was not Mr. Christensorfs intent or purpose, in executing the March 19, 1985 
Quit-Claim Deed to Zions Bank, to convey any personal interest in and to the Subject Property, 
as evidenced by the fact that the description on the Quit-Claim Deed includes other properties. 
19. The fact that Mr. Christenson executed the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed to Zions Bank 
in his capacity as trustee for the Cape Trust, rather than in his personal capacity, is further 
indicated by the following: 
a. The content of an affidavit executed by Mr. Christenson and dated 
January 14, 1999, wherein Mr. Christenson averred that he reviewed the 1985 Quit-Claim 
Deed to Zions Bank, and that "he signed said Quit-Claim Deed as trustee for Cape Trust 
to transfer the interest, if any, of Cape Trust in the Subject Property, and not any personal 
interest in the Subject Property"; and 
b. Mr. Christenson's testimony in court that he would not have put the word 
"trustee" next to his name on the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed if he intended to transfer his 
personal interest in the property. 
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20. On December 9, 1998, Richard A. Christenson gave a Quit-Claim Deed to 
Plaintiff TWN, Inc., describing the Subject Property, which was recorded in the Office of the 
Utah County Recorder on December 17, 1998, as Entry No. 132243 in Book 4904 at Page 845. 
21. The 1998 Quit-Claim Deed was executed by Richard A. Christenson, with no 
indication thereon that he was not conveying in his individual capacity. 
22. Mr. Christenson executed the December 8, 1998, Quit-Claim Deed with the 
intent, and for the purpose, of conveying his personal interest in and to the Subject Property to 
TWN, Inc. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-3-4. 
2. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties as residents of the state of Utah. 
3. Venue is properly in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, 
State of Utah, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-1. 
4. This matter was remanded for trial by the Utah Court of Appeals on the sole issue 
of whether, in executing the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed to Zions Bank as "Richard A. Christenson, 
trustee", Richard A. Christenson intended to sign as trustee of the Trust, thereby intending to 
convey the Trust's interest in the Subject Property, or whether he intended to convey his own 
personal interest, adding the term "trustee" to his signature merely as dcscriptio pcrsonae. 
5. Under the Court of Appeals' ruling, a grantor's execution of an instrument of 
conveyance as "trustee," without further explanation, raises the presumption that the word 
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"trustee" was included merely as dcscnptiopcrsonae, and that the grantor is presumed to have 
intended conveyance of his/her personal interest in the property being conveyed; however, this 
presumption may be overcome either by identification, in the instrument of conveyance itself, of 
the trust on behalf of which the conveyance occurs, or by other extrinsic evidence. 
6. As the Court is satisfied, based upon the evidence presented, that Richard A. 
Christenson intended to execute the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed as trustee for Cape Trust, and that his 
intent was to convey Cape Trust's interest in and to the Subject Property thereby, the 
presumption of descriptio personae is overcome. 
7. As such, the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed conveyed to Zions First National Bank only 
such interest as Cape Trust held in and to the Subject Property at that time. 
8. As of March 19, 1985, Cape Trust had no interest in and to the Subject Property; 
rather, as of that time, fee simple title in and to the Subject Property was vested in Richard A. 
Christenson, individually, by virtue of the 1984 Tax Deed. 
9. Title therefore remained vested in Richard A. Christenson, individually, until 
Decembers, 1998. 
10. The Quit-Claim Deed executed by Mr. Christenson on that date, and delivered to 
TWN, was sufficient to transfer title to the Subject Property from Mr. Christenson to TWN. 
11. Since December 8, 1998, fee simple title in and to the Subject Property has 
remained vested in TWN. 
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12. Defendants Uv\e Michel and Ullrich Michel received no right, title, or interest in 
and to the Subject Property pursuant to the April 13, 1993 Trustee's Deed from Zions First 
National Bank. 
13. All issues of fact and law previously raised by the parties in this action, other than 
those addressed above, have been resolved in this case by prior proceedings, were either 
not challenged on appeal or were not included by the Court of Appeals as part of this Court's 
mandate on remand, constitute law of the case, and need not be addressed again herein. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, as well as on prior 
proceedings in this case (including prior findings of fact and conclusions of law entered 
following the first trial of this matter on March 27, 2001, partial summary judgment as entered 
herein, and the ruling of the Court of Appeals referenced above), this Court enters the following 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT: 
1. That title be and hereby is quieted in Plaintiff TWN, Inc. in and to the following 
parcel of real property, located in Utah and Salt Lake Counties, State of Utah: 
COMMENCING at a point West 1979 feet from the Northeast comer of the 
Northwest quarter of Section 15, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian; and running thence South 2630.3 feet; thence West 1374.6 feet; 
thence North 2630.3 feet; thence East 1374.6 feet to the point of beginning. 
2. That TWN, Inc.'s title to said property is held free and clear of any claim of right, 
title, interest or encumbrance by or through Defendants Uwe Michel and/or Ullrich Michel. 
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3. That the lis pendens filed in connection with this litigation be and hereby is 
released. 
4. That costs be awarded to Plaintiff TWN, Inc., and against Defendants Uwe Michel 
and Ullrich Michel, by separate order upon application by Plaintiff TWN, Inc. under Rule 54(d), 
Utah R. Civ. P.. and that this judgment maybe hereafter supplemented in accordance therewith. 
5. That the parties bear their respective attorneys' fees. 
JUDGMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 
DATED this , ^C? day of Noyefflber, 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
'<?///„ 3^4-^^-
Fred D. Howard, District Jud«£ . 
7 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
NELSON CHRISTENSEN & HELSTEN 
By:. 
Bruce J. Nelson 
Attorneys for Defendants 
POUR"! H JUDICIAL DISTIWCOTJp'Wy,-
COUNTY RTATF OF UTAF|»/ $ .(,/',' f^'\ 
DATE'. 22L & m r //£> 
DEPUTY COURT < 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a tme and correct copy of the foregoing proposed 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, ORDER AND JUDGMENT was hand 
delivered this 15lh day of November, 2004, to the following: 
Bruce J. Nelson 
Nelson, Rasmussen & Christensen 
68 South Main, 6th Floor 
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